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reasonable assumptions about market prices on uncertain in-
vestments. Chapter IV gives the study on market price for-
mation.
The first paper was published in The Swedish Journal of Econ-
omics and reports an experiment with bond experts. The sec-
ond paper is a study of the yields on Norwegian Government
bonds, which was published in Stats~konomisk Tidsskrift.
This study was made to give a more consistent times series of
interest rates to be used in econometric studies of monetary
relations in Norway. It discusses relationship between trans-
actions and market prices for bonds, and the applied means
of approximation, when going from market prices to transac-
tion prices. The paper thus deals with the problem of time
being a variable allowed to take on real values. The com-
putational and estimation technique applied to construct
yield curves for Norwegian Government bonds, is used also
in the following paper on Italian Government bond yields.
In the third paper, which was published in Annales d l'INSEE
(French) and also in The Review of Economic Studies (English),
attention is on a possible market price of risk. Theprior
studies reported give a set of assumptions on which to base
a mean/variance equilibriu~model for the market prices of
risky assets. This model is tested on data from the Italian
bond market. The data are observed market prices for lottery
bonds. There appears to exist a market price of risk. This
price was stable over both short and medium term, i.e. over
a period of five years and also over one year subperiods.
In the French version, which is included in Appendix 11, it
is also shown how the above results may be useful in practice.
- III -
A typical situation will be for a potential borrower in the
bond market, who makes an initial study of possible prices
at which the market will accept different combinations of
coupons and repayment plans of a loan. Finally is shown how
the chosen formulation of the mean/variance equilibrium
model reconfirms some well known results on firm's market
values and investment criteria.

*)~hapter I.
Bond Evaluation as a Decision under Certainty or Uncertainty.
1. Introduction.
The series of studies which are presented in the chapters fol-
lowing, focus on the valuation and market price formation on
lottery bonds. This chapter will give an introductory descrip-
tion of these bonds and demonstrate the properties which make
lottery bonds particularly suitable for empirical investigati-
ons within the economics of uncertainty.
The lottery bonds are bearer's bonds. This means that a bond
is the property of the holder. When a large loan is to be made,
the borrower will consider various possible lenders, such as
banks and insurance companies, as well as the sale of bearer's
bonds through the bond market. The loan may exceed the lending
capacity of potential, individual leders, and so the bond market
may be chosen. The selling of bearer's bonds may also be the
cheapest means of financing large loans, when all costs such
as legal fees, guarantee provisions the the cost of printing
are taken into account, as well as the straight interest or
coupon of the loan.
When a loan is floated through the bond market, the money is
raised through the selling of bonds. The sum total of the face
values of the bonds is then equal to the amount of the loan.
The amount of the loan may, however, not be the same amount as
that which is received by the borrower. The bonds may have
been sold at a premium or discount from their face values, and
also the loan expenses will be deducted before the borrower
receives his money.
The loan agreement, which is the basis for the issuing and sel-
ling of bonds, also lays down the repayment plan for the loan.
One of the following three forms of repayment is usually chosen.
*) This chapter, whichgives an introduction to the empirical
studies, draws in part on my papers [6] and [8]. It also
takes into account the note by A. Buse [9] and my reply [10].
i .
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If the total amount of the loan will be repaid at a fixed future
date; the loan is said to have a fixed maturity. The loan may
be repaid through installments, sothat the total amount paid per
period is contant, and covers both interest and repayment of capi-
tal. This loan is an annuity loan. Thirdly the borrower may have
agreed to make constant repayments per period of the capital in
the loan. The loan is then a series loan.
If the loan has a fixed maturity date, all bonds will be redeemed
at that date. From the point of view of an investor, the cash
flow from the holding of a bond will consist of one or more pay-
ments for coupon, and at the end a coupon payment plus the re-
demption price of the bond. The redemption price is in most cases
equal to the par or face value of the bond.
A fixed maturity loan has the bulk of its payments at the end
of the loan period, when the loan capital is repaid. For the
borrower it may, however, be desirable with a program of more
even future payments. Such a program may permit a better timing
between the payments to the bond holders and the receipts from
the investments which the borrowed funds finance. Normally the
market rate of interest will increase with increasing time to
maturity for a loan. So that a loan with an even stream of re-
payments has a lower, average interest cost than a loan with
A
the same total loan period, but fixed maturity.
Into the consideration of choice between a fixed maturity loan
and an annuity loan or series loan, which are loans with more
even cash flows, also enters the expectation about future changes
in interest rates. With a fixed maturity loan, the borrower
may feel it necessary to build up a capital fund, with which
he will repay the loan at maturity. Such a sinking fund is
quite often a provision of the loan contract. Future interest
rates, therefore, determine the amounts to be invested in order
to build up a sufficient fund at the end of the loan period.
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2. A bond with fixed maturity.
To evaluate a bond with fixed maturity, the investor knows that
the bond will produce constant interest payments at regular time
intervals, and that it will be redeemed at a fixed price at ma-
turity.
Coupon payments are received at the end of each period and the
final coupon coincides with the redemption of the bond. For
the time being it will further be assumed that investor evalu-
ates a bond at the beginning of a period, and that the future
payments to him which the bond will give rise to, are discounted
at a constant rate of interest, i. The assumption of a con-
stant rate of interest underlies the construction of bond values
tables currently in use. The most common coupon period is six
months, with annual periods as the second most important.
The value of a bond may be expressed as the present value of the
future interest payments plus the present value of its redemption
price.
Bt










= present value of a bond with fixed maturity at time t.
= face value of bond
= bond's redemption price
= the coupon rate of interest (a percentage of the par value).
= time to maturity (measured in number of coupon periods).
= rate of interest or yield required by the investor




As a bond will normally be redeemed at its par value DR = D,
the common bond value formula found in bond values tables is:
D = 100 in the tables, so that values are given in percentage
of the face value of a bond.
3. A lottery bond.
When the loan is either a series loan or an annuity loan, the
loan contract will lay down the amount of capital to be repaid
on each future repayment date. At the end of the loan period
the total loan capital will have been repaid to the bond hol~ers.
One may think of three ways to arrange for the repayment of
series and annuity loans. The first is to split the loan up in-
to a set of fixed maturity loans, and to issue bonds for each
sub-loan. These bonds would have fixed maturities. The second
method would be to arrange for the repayment of each bond through
installments, so that the installments match the repayment plan
of the total loan capital. The third possibility, and the one
which is mo'~t'~ommonlY foundin practice, is to issue lottery
bonds. Each bond is then given a separate number, and a lottery
is arranged before each repayment date, so as to select the bonds
to be redeemed. A bond in a loan where the redemption of bonds
is determined through lotteries, is called a lottery bond.
If, for instance, the tota_l capital outstanding in a loan is
N.kr. 100 mill., and the loan is a 10 year series loan, the an-
nual repayment of capital will be N.kr. 10 mill. The bonds may
have face values of N.kr. 1,000.-, which means that a total of
100,000 bonds are held by the investors. 10,000 bonds will be
drawn for redemption in each of the ten lotteries, and the pro-
bability of a bond being drawn in the first, forthcoming lottery
i~ 16~:~~~= ;0' The probability of not being drawn is (1- l~) = {O.
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The second lottery will be arranged one year later, when 90,000
bonds will be outstanding. Again 10,000 bonds are to be drawn
for redemption. The probability of being drawn in the second
ft havi . d h f' . th 10.000 1lottery, a er aVlng surVlve t e lrst, lS en gO.OOO = 9'
The probability of a bond surviving the first lottery and being
f " h' 911drawn or redemptlon ln t e second lS consequently ~.~ = ,~.
J.. U 'j -L..'~
The probabilities, which may be taken as given data make lottery
bonds an interesting study in the economics of uncertainty. One
may ask how the information on the probabilities are used by
investors in the evaluation of bonds, and then see if there exists
a price of risk in the bond market. Before turning to these em-
pirical questions, a more general description of the lottery bond
will be given.
4. Probabilities
All bonds within one series of lotteries are of equal denominat-
ion. Each time a lottery is arranged, a specified amount of the
bond numbers still outstanding are drawn, with all nonredeemed
numbers having equal probability of occurring. The numbersdrawn
are published.
A probability distribution is objectively given as a consequence
of the redemption agreement in the bond issue. The distribution
changes every time a lottery has been arranged. Consider then an
investor who evaluates a bond at the beginning of a year. The
probability of the bond being drawn for redemption in the lottery
at the end of the first year is equal to the ratio between the
installment to be made in the lottery and the total amount of the
issue outstanding during the first year. The probability of a
bond being drawn for redemption in the second year's lottery, is
the combined event of the bond not being drawn in the first lot-
tery and being drawn in the second, where the probability of being
drawn in the second lottery is equal to the ration between the
installment to be made in that lottery, and the total amount out-
standing during the second year. This argument may be used to
derive the probability of a bond being drawn in a particular of
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9.
From formula (1) we have that the difference in value between
two certainty alternative bonds maturing in two consequtive
years is:
B. - B. 1 =J J- r - i(l+i)J
For a required yield smaller than the nominal rate of interest
the difference is positive, so that the bond values are monoton-
ically increasing with increasing number of years left to maturity.
If the yield is equal to the nominal rate of interest, the differ-
ence is zero, and the bond values are at par, independently of j.
Finally the yield may be higher than the nominal rate of interest,
leaving the difference negative, so that the bond values are
decreasing monotonically with increasing number of years to matur-
ity. From the denominator of the difference it may be noted that
the absolute value of the difference decreases with increasing












Along the j-axis are the future lotteries to be arranged, so that
j = 1 denotes the first forthcoming lottery, and B12 is the pre-
sent value of a bond with fixed maturity on the day of this lot-
tery if i<r. As J can only take on integer values, the curves
are not solid lines, but have been drawn as such to facilitate
the exposition.
Take the case when the required yield is higher than the nominal
rate of interest, i>r, and the certainty alternative bonds to a
lottery bond are all valued below par. If there are n more
lotteries to be arranged, on one of which the lottery bond will
be redeemed, the most cautious investor attitude will be to deem
the lottery bond equal to a certainty alternative bond with fixed
maturity on the day of the n'th lottery, and assign to it the
value Bnl' The investor is cautious because he assigns to the
lottery bond the value of its cheapest certainty alternative bond,
Should the bond indeed be drawn for redemption in the n'th lottery,
his expectations are exactly met; but if the bond is drawn earlier,
the investor's expectations are more than fulfilled. His most
optimistic attitude will be to deem the lottery bond equal to a
certainty alternative bond with fixed maturity on the day of the
first forthcoming lottery, and evaluate it at Bll.
These are both cases of extreme cautiousness or optimism, and it
may be reasonable to look at the case when the investor sets the
maturity of the certainty alternative bond at ~, where l<~<n.
Should the lottery bond be drawn for redemption in one of the
lotteries arranged before the ~th, the investor will experience
a gain, because the lottery bond is indeed worth more to him on
the day of evaluation if such a future event occurs. If, on the
other hand, the lottery bond is redeemed on one of the lotteries
arranged after the ~th, he will have a loss. The set of gains or
losses are the positive or negative differences between: the pre-
sent values of the set of certainty alternative bonds and the value
assigned to the lottery bond on the day of evaluation.
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Turn, then, to the case when the required yields is lower than
the nominal rate of interest, i<r, and the set of certainty alter-
native bonds to the lottery bond are all quoted above par. As is
seen from Figure 2, the picture of relative values is reversed.
In this case the investor of extreme caution would assume the
lottery bond to be redeemed at the first forthcoming lottery, and
evaluate it at B12. Whereas the extreme optimist would assume
the lottery bond to be drawn for redemption in the n'th and last
lottery, and set the value at Bn2.
6. Two observed decision rule£
It should be stressed at the outset that the rules to be repro-
duced are the result of a cursory investigation and discussion
with bond brokers. The observed decision rules are only indicat-
ions of direction. They should be read as rules of thumb, and not
as exact evaluation procedures. Their observation does, however,
point to interesting empirical questions. The two rules of thumb
observed for series bonds and annuity bonds, respectively, should
thus give an idea as to how one may set up an experiment to study
investors' valuation behaviour. In the next chapter is reported
an experiment which was carried out with the aim to study inves-
tors' treatment of risk when they evaluate lottery bonds.
When there are n more lotteries to be arranged and $ is the lot-
tery in which the lottery bonds is assumed to be drawn for redemp-
tion, the observed decision rule for a series-bond is:
(5 ) '" = n+l
'f' 2'
which is linear, and easy to apply when investor uses a book of
bond tables.
The median lottery is such that it is about as likely that a lot-
tery bond will be drawn fo~ redemption before the median lottery,
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as it is that it will be drawn later. The median bond to a lot-
tery bond is the certainty alternative bond with fixed maturity
in the median lottery. To deem a lottery bond equal to its med-
ian bond, the investor, therefore, behaves so as to hold the pro-
bability that he will experience a loss about equal to the pro-
bability that he will experience a gain.
For a series-bond the median bond can be determined as the cer-
tainty alternative bond with fixed maturity on the day of the








From this it may be inferred that if the investor behaves so as
to hold the likelihood of a gain about equal to the likelihood
of a loss, he may use the above decision rule in the case of equal
probabilities. He will only get integer solutions for ~ when
n is an odd number. So if n is even, an investor will take the
two integers closest to the solution for ~,and use the resulting
bond prices as guide points toAdetermine the value of the lottery
bond
For an annuity-bond the observed decision rule is:
(6) 2<p = 3" • n.
Again determining the median lottery
<p-l r(l+r)j-l =









(7) (l*r)<I>= {(l+r)n + l} (l+r)
(2+r)
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Fig. 3.
As is seen, the equation between <I> and n in (7) is not linear, not
even the logarithms. The most simple approach is to take som typi-
cal values for r, and for varying n choose <I>the integer that
minimizes the difference between the two sides of equation (7).
This has been done in Figure 3, and the straight line of the deci-
sion rule has been drawn for comparison. The observed decision
rule seems to give a reasonably good fit. A second indication is
therefore given that the i~vestors who apply the above rules, are
looking at some measure of the center of each of the two proba-
bility distributions. It may be, however, that the measure of
center is not the median, bu~ the mathematical expectation or
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mean. So that the two decision rules are tools whereby an inves-
tor gets a close approximation to the respective means.
7. The two means
The mean value of a lottery bond is the weighted average of the
set of present values of certainty ~lternat'ive bonds, where the
objectively given probabilities operate as weights. For a bond
with t years left to the last lottery and n more lotteries
to be arranged the mean will be:
n t\ \ -reB = t: t: p.·a. ·(l+i) ,
j=l re=l J Jre
where ajre denotes the payment that the lottery bond gives rise
to re years from the day of evaluation if the bond is drawn for
redemption in the j'th lottery.
Once the period of grace is over, and a lottery bond is evaluated





j =1 J J
n r (l+i)J-lL p. ~r' +j=l J, i(l+i)J -c -l-~-i-)--J },
because n is equal to t.
A series bond has the mean:
n 1 Jr. (l+i)j -1 (l~i)JBS = jfl - +n i(l+i)J
l{~ n (l+i)j (1 ) n 1 }= . L + ~ In l j=l (l+i)J l j=1 (l+i)J
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This is a well known result. It is usually obtained by assumlng
the investor to be someone holding a lar.ge number of bonds in the
lottery bond issue, so that he may, on the average, expect lln
of his holdings to mature in each of the future lotteries. For
the present paper, however, this line of argument is not applic-
able, as it is the evaluation of a single, risky asset that is
studied, independently of other risky assets.
Similarly for an annuity-bond. Once the number of lotteries left
to be arranged coincides with the number of years to final matur-
ity of the issue, the mean will be:
n r(l+r)j-l { (l+i)j-l
(l~i)J}BA
= I r' +j=1 (l+r)n -1· i(l+i)J
n t . -(T 0(1+r)j-l}r I 1~(l+r)J-l= ,(l+r)n -1 .l (l+i)JJ =1
= r {(l+r)n-l _(r-i)( 1 (1+r)n(1+i2-
n-l )}
(ltr)n-l ' i i (l+i) (l+r)(l+i) 1 -1
r (l+r)n(t+i)n_(l+r)n r(l+r)n (l+i)n-l= =
(l+r)n-l i(l+i)n n i(l+i)n(l+r) -1
(10) BA
-1 .= al1r anJi ,
which is also a well known result. Again investor may be 'assumed
to hold a large number of lottery bonds in the issue. For each
"kroner" in face value of bonds investor may expect to receive
-1approximately ~ from debtor in cover of interest and redeemed
bonds. These constant future receivables are discounted by an~
and BA is obtained. Both expressions for the means (9) and (10)
cqnbe found in textbooks, and are thus known to well informed
investors.
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8. Bonds with optional redemption
The lottery bonds described above leaves debtor with no other
possibilities but to arrange a lottery before each repayment of
capital in the loan. One may, however, not uncommonly find other
bond issues where debtor is given an optional strategy. He may
either arrange a lottery or purchase bonds in the market to ful-
fil the repayment plan. The bonds thus have optional redemption.
An investor's evaluation of an option bond will depend on what
future redemption decisions he expects debtor to make. Debtor's
strategy may be a mixed strategy, and one which depends on the
market bond yield on the day of evaluation, as well as his ex-
pectation of future changes in the rate of interest. For sim-
plicity, we shall give a small example, and assume that the in-
vestor expects the ruling bond yield to remain in the future.
Or alternatively, that his evaluation is only based on debtor's
first, forthcoming decision, and on the present yield.
Two observations have been made. If the yield is higher than
the nominal rate of interest on the bond, the valuation of an
option bond is made on the assumption that debtor will buy bonds
in the market to cover the installments. If, on the other hand,
the yield is lower than the nominal rate of interest, valuation
is made on the assumption that debtor will arrange a series of
lotteries in the future.
Had the investor made his valuation on a particular day, and
written his figure on a piece of paper to hide until debtor has
made his decision, the above problem could have been described
in the context of a two-person zero-sum game between investor and
debtor.l) Option bonds are, however, traded in markets where
1) It will be seen from the two payoff matrixes soon to be worked
out, that investor may well keep his valuation decision secret,
and act as if in a strictly competitive game. The valuation de-
cisions he would make by using the minimax theorem are the same
as investors are observed to make, and both payoff matrixes
have equilibrium pairs.
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prices are made public, so that debtor has information on at least
some investors' valuation decisions at the time when he has to
make a decision. It may be rational for investors, therefore, to
turn to decision theory under uncertainty and seek the assistance
of the maximin criterion.l)
If debtor decides to buy bonds in the market, this increase in
demand may increase the bond price. For an investor, however,
his bond will then have a fixed maturity at the end of the loan
period.
For a yield higher than the nominal rate of interest, i>r, it
has already been observed that a lottery bond will be valued
higher than a certainty alternative bond with fixed maturity on
the day of the last lottery. An example will be that investor
values the option bond at 80 if he expects debtor to arrange
lotteries, and 70 if he expects debtor to purchase bonds in the
market.
The payoff matrix is then:
Investor Debtor decides toevaluates
on the as- arrange purchasesumption of lotteries
lotteries 0 -la
purchase la 0
The elements of the matrix are gains (positive) or losses (nega-
tive). A gain or loss is the difference between the value inves-
tor assignes to the option bond and the value he would have given
the bond if he had known debtor's future decision. The maximin
criterion advises investor to seek out the minima of each row,
and choose the row with the highest minimum. Which lea~ investor
1) See Luce & Raiffa [7, p. 278]
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to make his evaluation of the option bond on the assumption that
debtor is going to purchase bonds in the market to cover his
obligations, if i > r. This is also what investors are observed
to do. Their reasoning when making this assumption being essenti-
ally the same as the one underlying the maximin criterion, namely
that debtor will always choos the action that is the least favour-
able one to investor, simply because it minimizes debtor's payments.
When the required yield is lower than the nominal rate of interest,
i<r, a lottery bond will be evaluated lower than a certainty alter-
native bond with fixed maturity on the day of the last lottery.
So that the example may be that investor values the option bond at
120 if he expects debtor to arrange a series of future lotteries,
and 125 if he expects debtor to buy bonds in the market.
Investor Debtor decides toevaluates
on the as- arrange purchasesumption of lotteries
lotteries 0 5
purchase -5 0
The maximin criterion would advise the investor to make his eval-
uation on the assumption that gebtor is going to arrange a series
of future lotteries. This again is indeed the assumption that
investors are observed to make. By arranging lotteries debtor is
able to redeem the bonds at par, whereas he would have to pay a
higher price should he decide to buy bonds in the market when
i<r. Investor, therefore, bases his evaluation of the option
bond on the assumption that debtor will choose the cheapest al-
ternative.
~. Other studies of bond values under uncertainty
Bonds with optional redemption and lottery bonds are examples of
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pure debt instruments which give rise to decision problems under
uncertainty.
The sources of uncertainty are provisions in the loan contracts,
which comes as an addition to the general economic uncertainty
due to all contracts which run into the future. A further example
of such uncertainty is given by the call privilege. Such a priv-
ilege exists if the debtor has been given the option to call the
entire bond issue. An option will usually be exerciseable over a
limited period of time, say three to five years before the final
maturity of the loan. The price at which the call privilege may
be exercised will normally start above the par value of a bond,
and decline towards par as the bond approaches maturity. The pos-
sibility that debtor may call a loan gives rise to a source of
uncertainty which is difficult to quantify in terms of probabili-
ties. The problem has been studied by Hess and Winn [ 3 ]..
Their method was to interview institutional investors and to ana-
lyze the market for high grade U.S. corporate bonds over the peri-
od 1926-1959. In general they found no significant relationship
between the call features and bond yields, except for 1959. Al-
thDugh institutional investors claimed that the call privilege
was valuable, Hess and Winn did not find that this was reflected
in the market place. Later market studies by Jen and Wert [4,5]
appear to confirm Hess and Winn's findings. Jen and Wert found,
however, that yield on callable bonds issued in periods of high
interest rates relative to the~r cyclical pattern, were high
in comparison with bonds of similar grading offered at other
times. This would be due to the expectation of a future decline
in interest rates, and the consequent refunding of callable, high
coupon loans.
Most empirical studies on bonds are focused on the term structure
of interest rates, which will be discussed in chapter Ill. Of
other bond related problems, Gelting [2] studies the effect of
monetary policy and the behaviour of financial institutions on
bond prices. Fisher [1] in a study of risk premiums on corporate
bonds, seeks to isolate the effects of the firm's default risk
andthe marketability of the bonds on bond yields. He uses the
three variables: past variability in earnings, past period of
20.
solvency and present equity/debt ratio as proxy variables for a
firm's default risk. Marketability is measured by the total
market value of the publicly traded bonds the firm has outstand-
ing. The regressions support the stated hypothes~s on risk pre-
miums. Fisher concludes that by design it could not be tested
whether investor behaviour is rational or stable, although he
found elasticities to be reasonably stable over time.
Fisher uses variables reflecting default risk to explain risk
premiums in the corporate bond market, but he expresses some
concern as to whether the variables chosen refl~ct the true mea-
sure of default risk. In other words it is asked whether the
variables chosen reflect the probability distribution with which
the investors feel that they are faced. It is this dilemma
that the lottery bonds solves. All relevant information on the
lottery risk is available to investors, so that the question
becomes one of isolating the lottery risk, in order to study
its effect on bond valuation.
21.
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An Experiment with Bonds and Risk.
Preface
In the foregoing chapter the valuation of lottery bonds
was classified as a decision under uncertainty. The
observed rules of thumb could ln themselves not be used
as a confirmation of the expected utility hypothesis. A
natural further direction of study, therefore, was to
set up and perform an experiment, with the intention of
obtaining more exact information on individual behaviour.
In the experiment to be reported,l) 30 bond experts were
asked to evaluate a set of series-bonds. Series bonds
were chosen because of the uniform probabilities, so that
the probability distributions are two-parametric. The
use of annuity bonds was excluded because tneir probabili-
ty distributions are skew, and the Arrow-Pratt risk av-
ersion measure to be used is formulated in the mean and
variance of each probability distribution.
The bond experts participating were active bond dealers.
This raises the problem of whether the bond values which
they gave, were in effect what the bonds would be worth
to themselves according to their personal risk preferences.
This is what the experiment aimed at. The fact that one
wished to have their personal assessments of values was
stressed in the written instruction, which each bond
expert was given, and also in the personal conversations.
But the question remains, whether the bond experts were
so used to think of bond values in terms of what the
bonds would trade for in the market, that it was too
much to ask them to try to disregard this aspect.
1) A detailed descriptiGn of the experiment is given in:
Cornelius M. Schilbred, An Experiment with Bonds and
Risk, Bergen, 1969.
23.
Furthermore, one might have wished to study the stability
of preferences over time. This might have been done by
revisiting eachbond expert, and ask him to evaluate'dif-
ferent sets of bonds. The purpose of the experiment was,
however, to get indication of reasonable assumptions to
make on investor behaviour. From these assumptions one
may formulate an hypothesis on the formation of market
prices for risk assets. It was felt that the stability
tests should be performed on a possible market price of
risk, as this raises fewer questions of measurement, than
does estimates of parameters in individual preference
functions. The market price of risk is also more inter-
esting and useful quantity, in the practical application
of the economics of uncertainty.
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AN EXPER[MENT WITH BONDS AND RISK
C. M. Schilbred
The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,
Bergen, Norwa.y
Summary
Thirty bond experts evaluated a set of Government bonds with maturit.ies given
through a series of lotteries. The bonds had varying coupons, equal me.turit.y
provisions and the oxperts hod access to a bond market, so that the yield on
alternative, certain investments was given. The runs of signs of observed r-isk
premiums discriminated between tho von Neumann and Morgeuetorn t.hcory of
economic behavior, nn alternnt ive behavior of maturity fixing or no systematic
bohavior.
Representative experts are well-described by the von Neumann and Morgenstcm
theory. These experts displayed risk aversion and their absolute ri;;k aversion
functions increased over the interval studied.
1. Introduction
Empirical studio!'! of individual behaviour under uncertainty usually attempt,
to derive underlying structures which may explain observations. The observa-
tions may be in the form of commonly observable facts, such as, for instance,
the willingness of people to buy insurance and lottery tickets. Other studies
derive data through controlled experiments, and still others from markets
where risky assets arc traded. The most well-known works within the above
cathegories are probably the ones by Friedman & Savage, Mosteller & Nogee
and Farrar.! This paper is a report. on an experiment, carried out with t.he
participation of Danish and Norwegian bond experts in an attempt to obtain
information on how risk is treated in risk-hiking situations.
The bonds, the evaluation of which is to be studied, are the so-called series-
bonds. These are regular bearer's bonds. From the point of view of risk, the
interesting aspect of a series-bond is the fact that it has an uncertain maturii y
date, with the probability of a, particular maturity objectively given through
information in the loan agreement, .
1 Friedman, ::\1. and I'n.vilge, t.: The utility of choices involving risk. Journal 0/ Political
Economy, 1948, pp. :279-304.
Mosteller, F. find ~ogee, P. An experimental measurement of utility, Journal. oj Political
Economy, 1951, pp. 371-404.
Farrar, D. E.: The l nnestment Decision. under Uncertair.u], Englowood Cliffs, K. J., 1962.
Swcd. J. of Ec01tcmirs 19i~
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2, Series-bonds and Characteristics of the Experiment
When a loan issue is floated through the sale of series-bonds, the debtor under-
takes to pay interest at regular time intervals, and to repay the loan through
a series of constant future installments, payable on specified dates. In order
to determine the particular series-bonds to be redeemed on each date, debtor
also agrees to provide for a series of future lotteries to be arranged, usually
under the auspices of some official authority. The debtor's obligation to repay
in equal amounts and to arrange lotteries, provides the bonds with objectively
given uniform probabilities. The probability that a series-bond will mature on
the date of the ith future installment payment, is
1
PI- -; i = 1, .," n
n
where n is the number of installments outstanding in the loan issue.!
Evaluating a series-bond, an investor is faced with three sources of uncer-
tainty: (a) the lotteries, (b)the risk of debtor's default of payments, and (c)
the likelihood of future shifts in the market term structure of interest rates,
which will reflect itself as capital gains or losses on bonds.
The idea of the experiment was to establish a situation where the risk of
default and also the market uncertainty would be absent. This leaves only
the uncertainty owing to the lottery provision, and this uncertainty was
controlled in the experiment.
The bonds chosen for the experiment were government bonds. This en-
sures that there will be no risk of default of payments, as it is within the
powers of governments to create money. The market uncertainty was obviated
by stating the market condition that a government series-bond with 5%
coupon and the same maturity provisions as the -'bther bonds in the experi-
ment would sell at par. The 5 % bond would continue to sell at par in the
forseeable future. The participants were thus faced with a market for govern-
ment bonds characterized by a horizontal yield curve for payments to be
received with certainty, this yield being 5% per annum.
The two hypotheses of the experiment are that the probabilities PI are used
by an investor in the process of evaluating a bond, and that he either forms
a probability distribution of future maturity dates, or a probability distri-
bution of present values.
In using a well-known type of security and letting bond experts be the
participants in the experiment, an attempt was made to obtain knowledge of
the considerations of men who have as their daily task to make decisions
under risk. Summers has criticized various earlier experiments for representing
highly artificial situations and yielding trifling pecuniary rewards or punish-
1 Schilbred, C. M.: Bond evaluation as &. decision under certainty, risk or-uncertainty. The
Swedi8h Journal ot Economics, 1968, pp. 43-56. .
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By asking an investor to evaluate diHerent risks. it is possible to derive
indirect observations on his absolute risk aversion function with the aid of
(5). The absolute risk aversion function may then be estimated. and the
estimate fed into
(6)
in order to get the utility function for money, which is then determined up
to a positive linear transformation.
Provided that a series-bond is under redemption, the first two moments of
the probability distribution of present values required by (5) are given by
(7) and (8).
" IE(B)= L -Bj
1-1 n
. (r !i-rl-V")E(B)= -;+--. -.- D,~ n, • (7)
(8)
The two partial derivatives with respect to the nominal rate of interest are
(9)
aO'~ 2(' ) 1.-=- ,-r"'2
8r
(10)
with le1 and k2 as follows:
k =ni - I + v"D and
1 ni2
Equations (9) and (10) show that if in an experiment i. nand D are held
constant. and chosen 80 that k1 and le: are both different from zero. it is possible
to face an investor with different risks by asking him to evaluate series-bonds
which have different values for r. From (9) it is seen that the expected present
value is then a linear function of r. The variance has the sign of the expression
within the right hand brackets of (8), or kt. As the variance is always non-
8wed. J. of Economics1972
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negative, so is kz, and the variance thus describes a parabola with a mini-
mum value of zero for r = i.
An investor who behaves in accordance with the expected utility hypothesis
is usually classified either as risk averter, risk neutral or risk lover. The olassi-
fication depends on whether he demands positive, zero or negative risk pre·
miums throughout. This property may be used to discriminate between the
two hypotheses proposed. For an investor who behaves according to the
first hypothesis (a maturity fixer), the value of a bond is B, as defined by (3),
so that YO =Bt. The observed risk premium for a maturity fixer will therefore
be
TI=E(B)-BC
TI (. ) (1- tin - nivt) D= I-r nit (11)
If for a set of series-bonds, n is kept constant, a maturity fixer will arrive at
one value for t, which is when he assumes that the bonds will mature. With i
and D also constant, his behaviour will cause the value of the right hand
fraction in (11) to stay fixed. So that by letting the nominal rates of interest
on the bonds run from smaller to larger values than i, the observed risk pre·
miums for a maturity fixer will change sign as r passes i.
The level of the wealth at which the change in sign of risk premiums occurs is
given by Z+D. D may in turn be chosen at will by the experimenter, so
that the change in sign of risk permiums can be made to occur at an arbitrarily
chosen level of the investor's wealth. This effect cannot be produced by any ordi-
nary utility function for money which assigns one, and only one, utility to
each amount of money. In the experiment D was held constant, so that only
two runs of signs would be produced by maturity fixers. Otherwise it would
have been difficult to distinguish their signs froIl1 signs produced at random,
and to isolate the maturity fixers. Their behaviour may in itself be worth
verifying. If, however, one wanted to set up an experiment solely to confirm
or reject the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory, D might be varied so
that the signs of risk premiums produced bya maturity fixer might equally
well have been produced by a random process.
4. The Experiment
Seventeen Norwegian and 13 Danish bond experts participated in the ex-
periment. They were all experienced bond dealers, and actively engaged
in trading with bonds. Each expert was asked to assume that he had won
or received as a. gift one of 14 different government bonds. He was then
asked to state what he felt each bond was worth, i.e. to state the cash
8'IDed. J. of EC01lO1nic8 1912
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Table 1. Expected preaent values, variance and median values 01 the bonds in the
experiment
n -16.5' 2 - 33, i - 0.05/2= 0.025, D = kr. 10000
Nominal Expected
rate present Median
Bond of value value
no. interest (kr ) Variance (kr )
1 2 1/2 8378 623739 8286
2 23/4 8540 505229 8457
3 3 8702 399 193 8629
4 3 1/4 8864 305632 8800
5 3 1/2 9027 224546 8972
6 3 3/4 9189 155934 9143
7 4 9351 99798 9314
8 41/4 9513 56136 9486
9 4 1/2 9676 24949 9657
10 5 10000 0 10000
11 5 1/4 10162 6237 10171
12 5 1/2 10 324 24949 10 343
13 5 3/4 10487 56136 10 514
14 6 10 649 99798 10686
amount that would have to be offered to him in order for him to be indifferent
between receiving the cash or the bond.!
All bonds were government series-bonds, had 161 years to final maturity
of their respective issues, and par value kr 10000. The nominal rate of interest
ran from 21% to 6 % per annum, with installments and interest beingpayable
semi-annually. The market condition was that bond no. 10, which carried a
nominal rate of interest of 5% per annum, traded at par value, and the experts
were asked to use this bond as a basis when evallIating the other 13 bonds.
The characteristics of the bonds are given in Table 1. Bond no. 10 could be
found on the Norwegian market, and it was quoted at par on the Oslo stock
exchange during the 12 days from March 8th to March 19th, 1968,when the
Norwegian experts were interviewed.Noneof the other 13bondswere traded at
the time on the Norwegian market. The Danish experts were visited during
the days from May 7th to May 16th, 1968.None of the bonds which they
were asked to evaluate were Danish government bonds on the market at that
time. A 4% series-bond with 164/12 years to maturity, semi-annual interest
payments and with installments payable annually was, however, quite comp-
arable to bond no. 7 in the experiment. It was quoted at 72.50% of par value,
thus yielding approximately 8.90% per year. So the 5% market situation,
which the Danish experts were asked to assume, was quite different from
the market situation they were experiencing in Copenhagen at that time.
1 The experts were asked to disconsider possible differences between the tax liability on
income from interest payments and capital gains-or losses.
8w.ed. J. of ECO'1Iomic81972
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5. Two Special Hypotheses
An earlier investigation gave that a series-bond was deemed equal to its median






The median bond thus matures on the expected value of the future maturity
dates. An investor who uses (12), as a decision rule would be classified as a
maturity fixer. Equation (12) was taken as an indication that the experts
looked at some measure of the center of the uniform probability distribution
when assessing the value of a bond. Itwas suggested, however, that they might
indeed be aiming for the expected present value, and that (12) could be used
to get a value close to this. Two special hypotheses suggest themselves from
these considerations. The significance level in the statistical analysis is 5 %.
The first special hypothesis is that if a bond expert is chosen at random and
asked to evaluate a series-bond, he will evaluate it to be equal to its median
bond. With qJ=(33+1)/2=17, the median bond matures in st years. The
present values of the median bonds to the series-bonds in the experi- ment
are given in Table 1. Multivariate statistical analysis is used. Assuming
the observations come from a normal distribution N(fl, ~), the first hypo-
thesis is that the unknown mean vector is the vector of median values, /l = flrn'
A value for the statistic Fl3• 17= 1.67 implies that this hypothesis cannot
be rejected.
The second special hypothesis is that the bond expert will evaluate the
series-bond at its expected present value. Testing now the hypothesis that the
unknown mean vector is the vector of expected present values in Table 1,
fl = flE(B)' the computed statistic F 13. 17= 1.69 says that this hypothesis also
cannot be rejected.
This experiment thus yields that predictions on bond expert va.luations
would be about equally good from either the median or the mean hypothesis.
6. Risk Premiums and Expert Classification
The experts are classified on the basis of runs of signs of their risk premiums,
and the null hypothesis is that the signs have been produced at random. If
an expert's values lead to rejection of the null hypothesis, he will be classified,
otherwise he will be left unclassified.
First, it may be noted that for a risk averter or risk lover all risk premiums
will be of equal sign. With the probability of a plusequal to that of a minus,
1 Bond Evaluation, pp. 49-50.




Maturity Risk Unc1as· Total
Experts fixers averters sified
Norwegians 10 5 2 17
Danes 3 5 5 13
Total 13 10 7 30
the probability of observing a risk averter, risk neutral or risk lover, is 0.0001
under the null hypothesis. Such behaviour would, therefore, strongly reject
the null hypothesis.
As r <i for the first 9 bonds and r>i for the last 4, a maturity fixer will
have 9 signs of one kind followed by 4 of the other, i.e. exhibit 2 runs. An
occurrence of this event under the null hypothesis has the probability 0.0028,
so that a maturity fixer will also be eligible for classification in the experiment.
Both the hypothesis for a maturity fixer and the expected utility hypothesis
would predict few runs of signs, so that the test is one-tailed.
The classification procedure for an expert is first to substitute sign indicators
for the risk premiums of the observation vector and apply the one-sample
runs test.! If the expert is cleared for classification, his vector of sign indicators
is compared with each of four classification vectors, one for risk averters, one
for risk lovers and two for maturity fixers (one for signs running from positive
to negative, and one for negative to positive). The expert is then classified
into the group from which he has the smallest sum of squared differences of
sign indicators.
Table 2 shows the results of the expert clasgttication.
Testing the hypothesis that these is no difference beha.viour between Danes
and Norwegians, a X2 =5.4, indicates that there was no significant difference.
This may mean that both groups have understood the experiment about equally
well, and that they have accepted its market conditions.
On the average, posit_ive risk_pre- *)
miums were demanded for all 13 bonds. If one were to choose a representative
bond expert, this would favour the choice of a risk averter. If instead, the
nominee represents the majority, a maturity fixer would be the candidate, as
there were 13 maturity fixers and 10 risk averters participating.
Table 3 shows that most of the participants held senior positions in their
firms, and that among those holding senior positions the majority were risk aver-
ters. If a senior position is indicative of a more mature comprehension of bond
1 Negativ~ risk premiums were given O·indicator and nonnegative Ivindicetor, Risk
neutrals will thus be classified as risk averters; but they wilJ be isolated in section 7.
Swed. J. of ECO'1Wmic8 1972
*) In the article reference is mp-ne to table 2, which was
omitted in the final edition,
33.
A n Experiment with B0nd8 and Ri8k
Table 3.
Maturity Risk Unclas-
fixers averters sified Total
Directors & h.o.d.
Partners 7 9 5 21
Brokers 6 2 9
Total 13 10 7 30
evaluation problems, this would mean selection of a risk averter. The proba-
bility is that their considerations carry heavier weight in the actual price bar.
gaining on the exchange.
7. Absolute Risk Aversion and Utility Functions for Money
The absolute risk aversion function should be evaluated at the points (Z + E{ Y)),
i.e. initial wealth plus the expected value of the risk. However no informs-
tion on initial wealth was obtained. The functions were, therefore, only
studied over the interval [Z -l-kr. 8378, Z +kr. 10649].
In order to draw conclusions about the economics of uncertainty, it is often
enough to know whether the absolute risk aversion function is increasing,
constant or decreasing with increasing wealth. The absolute risk aversion
functions were studied over an interval of kr. 2271, which is likely to
represent about half of a month's salary after tax for most of the risk
averters participating. If it is assumed that the absolute risk aversion function
is linear, or that it may be approximated with a linear function over this
interval, it is possible to obtain information on its slope. The estimates are
given in Table 4.
Table 4. Estimate 0/ Ra=C+D{E{B) -8 378)
F (2,11)
Constant Regression joint test
Expert term coefficient on G and D
no. G F(I,ll) D F (I,ll) estimates
s -0.00064 0.03 0.0000051 4.20 5.60
6 -0.00483 0.58 0.0000119 6.01 5.51
9 -0.00349 0.30 0.0000097 3.96 3.86
10 0.00057 0.06 0.0000032 3.29 6.46
17 0.00008 0.33 0.0000002 6.93 15.36
18 -0.00140 0.32 0.0000036 3.83 3.62
19 -0.00141 0.06 0.0000129 9.65 13.17
21 0.00195 0.54 0.0000054 7.22 17.40
26 -0.00482 0.78 0.0000119 8.17 7.49
27 0.00000 0.01 0.0000000 0.87 1.63
Swed. J. of Economics 1972
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The three hypotheses tested are whether the constant term 0, the regression
coefficient D, or both, are equal to zero. Looking first at the joint hypothesis
on 0 and D, the hypothesis that they are both zero cannot be rejected for
experts nos. 9, 18, and 27. The three are risk neutral, and might be described
by the utility function for money u(x) =X. For the 7 other experts the joint
hypothesis is rejected. None of the constant terms are significant, nor are the
regression coefficients for nos. 5 and 10. Nos. 6, 17, 19,21 and 26 do, however,
have significant regression coefficients. The slopes of their absolute risk aver-
sion functions are all positive, indicating increasing absolute risk aversion for
these 5 experts.
Returning finally to the selection of a representative bond expert, and feeling
that he should be a risk averter, the average risk premiums of Table 2 suggest
that his utility function for money should have the property of increasing
absolute risk aversion.! If in fact the absolute risk aversion is linear, Ra(x) = D»,
Borcht has shown that the utility function is the cumulated normal distribu-
tion.
where 0 is a constant of integration. This utility function is bounded from
below and from above, and thus satisfies Menger's conditions.s
8. Conclusion
In the evaluation of series-bonds an investor is given information on a set of
uniform probabilities through the redemption .agreement of the loan.
Two hypotheses on investor behaviour are proposed and tested. One is
that the investor uses the probabilities to form a distribution of future maturity
dates, and derives an assumed maturity from this distribution. The series-
bond is then given the value of a bond with fixed maturity on the assumed
maturity date. The second hypothesis the is that investor behaves in accordance
with the von Neumann and Morgenstem theory of economic behaviour. The
two hypotheses are distinguished by means of runs of signs of risk premiums.
Thirty bond experts participated in the experiment, and each was given 13
bonds to evaluate. The general result was that good predictions are made by
assuming that experts fix the maturity of a series- bond to its expected maturity,
or that they evaluate the bond at its expected present value.
10-0.00005, F8.11)=0.OO;D=0.OOOOO24, F8,m=6.75; F&R)=IO.90.
I Borch, Karl.: Decisions rules depending on the probability of ruin, Oxford Economic
Paper8, vol. 20, no. I, March 1968, pp. 1-10.
a Menger, K.: Das Unsicherheitsmoment in der Werlehre, Zeit8chrift fur Nationaiolconomie,
1934, pp. 459-485.
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For experts whose behavior is explained by the von Neumann and Morgen-
stern theory of economicbehaviour, it was attempted to derive utility functions
for money. The two utility functions, which seem to suggest themselves are
the linear and the cumulated normal distribution. A representative expert is
characterized by the normal distribution.
8wed. J. of EC01Iomics 1972
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Chapter III
Yields on Norwegian Government Bonds - Quarterly 1958-1971
Preface
When forming their assessments of bond values, the investors
are assumed to have access to a market for risk free invest-
ments. In the experiment this was the market for a Govern-
ment bond with no lottery risk. The yield on this Government
bond was thus given to be the yield on alternative, risk free
investments open to investors in lottery bonds. In the ex-
periment, the yield curve, which gives the relationship be-
tween yield and time to maturity for bonds trading on a day,
was thus given to be a constant 5% per year.
The rest of this book will be a report on studies of market
prices, and how these are formed. Still the investors are
assumed to have access to a market for risk free investments
in Government bonds. But in the market, the yield curve for
yields on Government bonds can not be assumed a constant
function of time i(t) = a, where i = yield to maturity,
t = time to maturity and a = constant.
Time to maturity, t, was sgt to be an integer in the experi-
ment. When studying the market, however, time to maturity
must be allowed to be a real number. The paper uses a stan-
dard prosedure to allow for this, so as to explain t~trans-
action prices for bonds. But when setting the market prices
for bonds, bond dealers use bond values tables which contain
what is formally a mathematical error. The error is to let,
the variable time in the formula for bond values, take on
real values, whereas the formula is only valid for integer
values of t. It is explained how bond dealers correct for
this error, through the established practise of adding sim-
ple interest to the maTket prices quoted, in order to obtain
the transaction prices.
37·
Yield curves give a condensed description of the interest
rate structure on a particular trading day. The paper explains
the construction of yield curves through regressions. The pur-
pose of the paper is to show how one may construct a consistent
times series of interest rates for Norwegian Government bonds.
This same technique is then in turn used for Italian Govern-
ment bonds, as part of the study to be reported in chapter IV
on market prices for risk investments.
38.
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YIELDS ON NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT BONDS
QUARTERLY 1958-1971*
By CORNELIUS M. SCHILBRED
1. Introduction.
This study discusses the procedure of yield computation for bonds.
The purpose is to support other studies of Norwegian monetary rela-
tions with more satisfactory interest rate data than those which are
at present available.' These series are such as to make comparisons
over time doubtful, and the following suggests how this may be rec-
tified.
The yield data presently published by the Norwegian Central
Bureau of Statistics are the yields on three government bonds. Two
of these have medium or short term to maturity and one is a long term
bond. The same bonds are, however, used in the series over a period
of time, so that their terms to maturity decrease. This may in itself
be an undersirable property in a time series of interest rates. Another
problem is that the bonds in the series will have to be replaced at
regular intervals. This may cause shifts in the time series published',
buth such shifts may not necessarily reflect shifts in the market rate
of interest.
In the following it will be explained how the bond yields have been
* This is one of a series of monetary studies at the Norwegian School of Eco-
nomics and Business Administration, supported with grants from the Bank of
Norway's Fund for Economic Research and the Research Fund of the Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration.
I wish to thank Thore Johnsen for programming assistance, and Norges Bank for
providing most of the quarterly price data before 1969.
1 See Teigen (1972), and Teigen, Schilbred and Thore (1971).
2 See OEeD (1970) p. 35. There is, for example, an upward shift in long term
yield in 1962 IV caused by a new bond being entered in the series. From figure 4
is seen that the long rate appears to have fallen in this period according to the present
series.
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computed from observed market prices. From the computed yields
a set of yield curves has been estimated. These yield curves were
then used to construct time series of interest rates, one short term
and one long term yield.
2. Market and Transactionsprices.
Before addressing the question of yield computation, a brief account
of how bond prices are computed may be in order. A standard bond
is a promise by the debtor to pay to the holder of the bond one or more
amounts of money in coupon payments at a definite point or points
in time, and to redeem the bond at its maturity. The value of a bond
is equal to the present value of the amounts of money payable over its
life:
(1' ) "B,,= L D·r·vi+D·vn
j=l
B" = value of bond maturing at time n
r = coupon paid per period (per cent)
t = yield per period (per cent)
v = (I +i) -1= discount factor
D = par value of the bond = 1 in the following.
Taking the sum on the right hand side of (1') and ordering)
(1)
(1) is the ~andard formula used in the computation of bond values
tables.
As n is a summation index, formula (I) is only valid for integral
values of n. If, say there are annual coupon payments in a bond issue,
this means that formula (1) can only be used to compute the value of
a bond when it has one, two, three or more years to maturity.
In order to derive a more general formula, (1) may be used to obtain
the value of a bond at its last coupon payment. The bond then had
n periods outstanding to maturity and its value was Bn. Define the
40.
part of the coupon period which has elapsed since the last coupon
payment to be IX, so that 1 -IX is the part of the coupon period out-
standing to the next payment. Time to maturity as on the day of
computation is t. With IX and t being real numbers, n will thus be the
first integer larger than t, n = [t], and t =n - IX. The coupon payments
are spaced with equal time intervals between them, usually one half
or one year, with the last coupon payment being made on the day of
redemption of the bond. Time from the day of computation to the
day of a coupon payment, s, may therefore be written s =j - IX, where
j =[s].
Assuming a constant yield, i, per period, and that the discount
factor is a continous function of time, v(s), the present value of a
bond maturing at time t will be
"Bt= I rv'+vt ,
j=l
and, as s =j - IX and t = n - IX,
"Bt= I rvj-«+v"-« ,
t= 1
(2) ( ')«{ r i-r"}Bt= 1+1 i+-i-v
because v-« = (I +i)"'.
Formula (2) is the general formula for the present value of a
bond with t periods to maturity. It will be shown that by current
practice of bond brokers, the transactions prices between buyers and
sellers of bonds are close approximations to (2). A clear distinction
must, however, be made between market prices and transactions
prices.
The market prices are computed from formula (1). Bond values
tables 3 currently in use are based on formula (1), where n is allowed
to take non-integral values. This, of course, is incorrect and yields
3 See for instance: Comprehensive Bond Values Tables, Computed and Compiled
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observable market prices which are economically meaningless.' The
standard procedure of setting a market price appears to be the fol-
lowing. First a desired or market yield to maturity is set, then a bond
value table is used to get the market price.
Figure 1 gives the relationship between time to maturity and price.
The transaction prices are given by formula (2) and the market prices
by formula (1). Coupon payments are made at the points in time
0,1,2.5
, Such prices may be commonly observed in, among other, the following countries:
Denmark, England, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the U.S.A.
6 The curves have been drawn as straight lines, which is an approximation.
The market price curve is concave to the origin if the yield is below the coupon,
and it is convex to the origin if the yield is above the coupon; see Malkiel (1962).
The transaction price CUI ve is a step function. The steps occur because the value of
a bond falls by the amount of the coupon payment on each coupon date. a on
that day goes from 1 to 0, so that the transaction and the market price coincide
when the coupon has been paid. n is a constant between two coupon payments,
when a runs from 0 to 1, and (1+i)1l therefore from 1 to 1+i, exponentially.
Thus the transaction price curve is stepwise convex to the origin.
It is seen from figure I why the market prices are economically
meaningless. Take, for simplicity the case where yield to maturity is
constant over time, and this yield is smaller than the coupon rate for a
particular bond, i-« r. The market price will then be above par, and
it will decrease as the bond approaches maturity. This means that,
for instance, the bond will be priced lower when it has 1/2 of a coupon
period left to maturity than when it has 3/4 of a period, say a year,
left. But with positive time preference, i >0, one should indeed be
willing to pay more for an amount payable in six months than for
the same amount payable in nine months.
The difference between the transactions price (2) and the observable
market price (1), for a given time to maturity t, is:
(1 ')II{r i-r n} {r i-r t}+Z i+-i-v - i+-j-V =
(3') (1 ')II{r i-r n} {r i-r n-II}_ r{(l ')11 1}+1 -+-V - -+-V -- +1-
i i i i i
Bond brokers have, however, established a practice of "adding
simple interest at the coupon rate" to the market price in order to
obtain the price to be used in the transaction between buyer and seller.
The work is done back in the broker's office, where the amount ar
is added to the market price. This yields a difference between the






Expanding (I + it in a Taylor's series and substituting
r{ . GO a.(a.-l)... (a.-k+l).k }
- 1+on+ I 1 - 1 - er
i k=2 k!
r GO a.(a-O"'(a-k+l)'k-L: I
i k=2 k!
(4) gives the difference between the theoretical transaction price and
the real transaction price. In general (4) will be very small. If for
(4)
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instance a bond pays 6% annual coupon and yields 6% per annum,
a kr. 1000 bond will be traded at a price which is kr. 0.437 too high,
if there are 6 months outstanding to the next coupon payment.
Equation (4) shows that by adding simple interest to the market
price, the bond brokers are correcting an error committed in the
computation of bond values tables. The resulting transaction price is
a close approximation to the theoretical price. The problem remains,
however, that the market prices as usually quoted, are meaningless
in an economic sense. It would be an improvement if the market price
would be the sum of the price read from bond values tables and simple
interest. Simple interest appears to be "included in the market price"
for a few bonds on some exchanges." This should, however, be the rule
and not the exception.
3. The computation ofyield to maturity.
The yield computations were made for prices quoted for Norwegian
government bonds on the Oslo exchange on the last trading day of
each quarter. For the prices observed, formula (1) was used ID obtain
the yield to maturity." A search algorithm was used. Given its time
to maturity, the value of a bond by formula (1) is decreasing mon-
otonically with increasing values for the yield, i.B By trying different
values for i and computing the market value from formula 1), a
binary search method was used to obtain a value for i, which was
such as to yield a market price sufficiently close to the price observed.
The criterion for sufficient accuracy was that the yield tried should
not give a price which differed from the observed price by more than
± kr. 0.025. The market prices are given with intervals of kr. 0.05,
so that this accuracy criterion exhausts the accuracy of the given
market price. This means, for instance. that if the market price
6 There are no bonds on the Oslo exchange where simple interest is included in
the market price. Although no thorough investigation has been made. simple interest
is included in the market price on some Italian bonds. and also on some C.S. bonds.
7 Information on coupon and redemption plan was obtained from Hdndbok over
norske obligasjoner og aksjer, published by Carl Kierulf & Co. A/S Oslo.
8 B. Malkiel (1962).
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quoted was kr. 100.00, the search would stop if the yield tried gave a
market value between kr. 99.975 and kr. 100.025.
For the bonds which do not have a fixed maturity but are redeemed
through a series of lotteries, the time to expected maturity was used
in the calculations above." A series-bond was expected to mature
on the day of its lottery number
k 1 . k+l
L-'J=-,
j=l k 2
where k is the number of future lotteries to be arranged. For an an-
nuity-bond the expectation for the lotteries is
k r(l+r)j-l. k(1+r)kL 'J -----,----.
i=l(l+rl-l (l+rt-l r
There also exist government loans where the government has the
option either to arrange lotteries or to purchase bonds in the market
in order to meet the repayment schedule. Such bonds were treated
.as fixed maturity bonds if the price was below par, and as lottery
bonds if the price was above par.!"
4. Yield curves.
The purpose of a yield curve is to convey in a simple manner the
relationship between the market yield and term to maturity.'! David
Durand (1942) is the classic in the construction of yield curves. Durand
suggests four different yield curves as typical. Three of them are shown
• The assumption is that bond brokers behave so as to represent a bond with an
uncertain maturity with the median bond to the lottery bond. See C. M. Schilbred
(1972).
10 This is a standard market convention. See for instance]. Grant (1964), the
U .S. Treasury Bulletin and C. M. Schilbred (1968).
11 Term to maturity is the usual measure of the duration of a loan. F. Macaulay
(1938) has, however, suggested a more composite measure, which also takes into
account the coupon rate. For two bond! with the same time to maturity but with
different coupons, the bond with the highest coupon is defined by Macaulay to
have the shortest duration, as this is the bond where the weight of the total payments
is the earliest from today.
- : i= a-s-b]:
t
Figure 2.
as curves D, Hand U in figure 2. Durand's fourth curve has the form
of the dotted curve in figure 2.
Durand fitted his yield curves by freehand to the observed yields.
An alternative technique is to choose a set of yields which span the
maturity range studied, and to use linear interpolation to draw the
yield curves. This was done by Grant (1964). Still another method
is to use linear regression analysis to estimate the yield curves. K.
Cohen, R. Kramer and W. H. Waugh (1966) used this approach for
V.S. government securities, and D. Fisher (1966) used it for British data.
In the construction of yield curves, one has to treat large amounts
of data. With the storage facilities of present computers, it is a simple
task to update a time series of yield curves based on regression analysis,
once the initial programs have been developed. As it is the purpose
of the present work that it shall be simple to obtain interest rate data
for monetary studies, it was therefore, chosen to use regression analysis
to estimate the yield curves.
The functional form chosen was the curves D, Hand U of figure 2.
These are obtained by estimation of the rectangular hyperbola
(5) i=a+b/t+e
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where i = yield per year
t = years to maturity
e = the estimation error.
The estimated constant term, a, may be seen as "the long term
rate of interest". Formally speaking a is the rate of interest on a
perpetual bond, but no such bonds exist in Norway. By letting t = 1
in (5), it is seen that the sum of the coefficients a +b, give the rate of
interest on a one-year bond.
In the regressions, bonds with optional redemption were deleted from
the data. Their yield moved out of line with the other yields during
the period. The government issued no loans with optional redemption
in the later years, and most of such existing loans matured during the
period. The market for these loans became rather inactive, and at
times the government found it difficult to obtain through the mar'ket
the amount of bonds necessary to fulfill the redemption obligations.
For this reason the loans with optional redemption were not included
in the estimated time series of interest rates.










58 1 ........... 4.901* 0.061 -1.779* 0.102 0.9433 20
11 ........... 4.673* 0.090 -1.374* 0.120 0.8727 21
III ........... 4.619* 0.119 -1.301* 0.164 0.7681 21
IV ........... 4.501* 0.120 -1.041* 0.130 0.7785 20
59 1 ........... 1:715* 0.306 -2.170* 0.668 0.3829 19
II ........... 4.691* 0.279 -2.514* 0.621 0.4766 20
III ........... 4.635* 0.286 -1.992* 0.623 , 0.3617 20
IV ........... 4.623* 0.248 -1.748* 0.529 I 0.3771 2060 1 ........... 4.570* 0.263 -1.435* 0.548 0.2759 20
11 ........... 4.600* 0.280 -l.l81* 0.558 0.1987 20
III ........... 4.545* 0.248 -0.977 0.473 0.1911 20
IV ........... 4.518* 0.233 -0.916* 0.417 0.2110 20
61 1 ........... 4.727* 0.165 -2.070* 0.302 0.7342 19
11 ........... 4.803* 0.147 -1.852* 0.216 0.8108 19
III ........... 4.743* 0.204 -1.466* 0.374 0.4894 18








62 I ........... 4.554* 0.237 -1.081* 0.396 0.4030 13
11 ........... 4.824* 0.160 -2.175* 0.293 0.8459 12
III ........... 4.956* 0.126 -2.180* 0.193 0.9267 12
IV ........... 4. 711 * 0.108 -0.943* 0.201 0.7094 11
63 I ........... 4.621* 0.098 -1.068* 0.182 0.7571 13
11 ........... 4.592* 0.104 -0.782* 0.181 0.6279 13
III ........... 4.531 * 0.101 -0.511 * 0.162 0.4741 13
IV ........... 4.657* 0.096 -0.993* 0.168 0.7772 12
64 I ........... 4.558* 0.166 -0.459 0.346 0.163.7 11
11 ........... 4.590* 0.133 -0.381 0.269 0.1815 11
III ........... 4.665* 0.102 -0.702* 0.202 0.5724 11
IV ........... 4.620* 0.094 -0.327 0.180 0.2673 11
65 I ........... 4.640* 0.097 -0.485* 0.181 0.4175 12
11 ........... 4.730* 0.107 -0.279* 0.188 0.1663 13
III ........... 4.977* 0.158 -2.045* 0.335 0.7562 14
IV ........... 4.960* 0.168 -1.760* 0.353 0.6739 14
66 1 ........... 4.946* 0.138 -1.849* 0.293 0.7397 16
11 ........... 4.890* 0.144 -1.513* 0.303 0.6398 16
III ........... 4.869* 0.125 -1.544* 0.263 0.6960 17
IV ........... 4.799* 0.125 -1.146* 0.259 0.5499' 18
67 I ........... 4.883* 0.112 -1.292* 0.224 0.6488 20
11 ........... 4.822* 0.082 - 1.061 * 0.153 0.7257 20
III ........... 4.754* 0.060 -0.819* 0.100 0.7445 25
IV ........... 4.906* 0.118 -1.527* 0.243 0.6205 26
68 I ........... 4.883* 0.110 -1.318* 0.221 0.5678 29
11 ...... ;•.... 4.855* 0.099 -1.064* 0.190 0.5367 29
III ........... 4.756* 0.081 -0.727* 0.140 0.4975 29
IV ........... 4.687* 0.064 -0.465* 0.082 0.5408 29
69 1 ........... 4.745* 0.082 -0.791* 0.144 0.5154 30
11 ........... 4.732* 0.073 -0.666* 0.103 0.5991 30
III ........... 5.290* 0.228 0.785* 0.346 0.1459 32
IV ........... 5.590* 0.249 0.617 0.412 0.0741 30
70 1 ........... 5.401* 0.239 I.791 * 0.376 0.4302 32
11 ........... 5.748* 0.129 -0.013 0.200 0.0001 35
III ........... 5.612* 0.114 0.508* 0.156 0.2414 35
IV ........... 5.720* 0.085 -0.216 0.106 0.1145 34
71 1 ........... 5.413* 0.234 2.552* 0.330 0.6810 30
11 ........... 5.664* 0.113 0.160 0.157 0.0359 30
III ........... 5.617* 0.1l6 0.523* 0.150 0.3104 29
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Table I reports the regressions. The level of significance chosen is
5%, and significant estimates are marked with asterisks. Table 2 below







neg. I pos. I total
Significant at 5% level .............. 55 41 5 46
Not significant at 5% level .......... 0 7 2 9
Total ............................. 55 48 7 55
All the constant terms were significantly different from zero. The
estimated values for a should thus give a good indication of the yield
on a long term bond at the end of each quarter. Long term may, for
practical purposes, be taken to mean maturities longer than 12 years.
Of the estimates on regression coefficients 4-6out of 55 were signifi-
cant; 4-1of these were negative, which means that the yield curve was
of the form U, or upward sloping. 5 had positive and significant re-
gression coefficients, saying that the yield curves were downward
sloping, D. In 9 quarters the estimated regression coefficients were
not significantly different from zero. The yield curves in these cases
were horizontal lines, H.
The coefficient of determination, R2, varied between 0.00 (1970 II)
and 0.94-(1958 I). In 1970 II the yield curve was horizontal. The esti-
mated constant term was 4-5 times its standard error. The R2 ex-
presses the correlation between the yield and time, and when the yield
curve is horizontal, there is no such correlation. This means that the
R2 is only an interesting statistic in the case of an upward or a down-
ward sloping yield curve. Figure 3 shows the estimated yield curves
for 1958 I and 1970 I together with the computed yields and maturities.
For 1970 II one sees how the horizontal yield curve appears to be
representative of the market situation, although the R2 = 0.00.
In 1958 I the yield curve is clearly upward sloping, and tae R2 is a
meaningful statistic.
i % i=5.748 - 0.013/t; R2=0.007
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Chapter IV
The Market Price of Risk.
Preface
The main result of the experiment in chapter 11 was that the
von Neumann and Morgenstern theory of economic behaviour may
be used to describe the investor's treatment of risk. The
investors were typically risk averse, and their absolute risk
aversion increasing with increasing wealth over the interval
studied. A cumulated normal distribution is among the utility
functions for present wealth which fit the observed behaviour of
investors. Another utility function which displays increasing
absolute risk aversion is the quadratic u(x) = x-cx2.
The experiment was set up on the assumption that the two first
moments, the mean and variance, contain the essential relevant
information to investors. This assumption is maintained in the
study of market prices, which is reported in the following papers.l)
The equilibrium model to be formulated as the hypothesis for
observable market prices, will thus be a mean/variance equilib-
rium model. The means and variances are over probability dis-
tributions of present values for the lottery bonds.
The choice of present values was made because the possible cash
flows from each lottery bond have different time lengths. So
that if one were to choose the standard formulation that in-
vestors' maximize the expected utility of end of period wealth,
1) The :market price study was first published in French:
Cornelius M. Schilbred, "Le prix du risque", Annales de
l'INSEE,'no. 9, Jan.-April 1972, pp. 89-118. A condensed
version was subsequently published in The Review of Econo-
mic Studies, Vol. XL(2), April 1973, pp. 283-292. The
English RES version is included in this chapter to give a
consistent presentation in language. The Annales paper is
given in Appendix 2.
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the determination of the length of this period itself poses
a difficult and critical problem. The present value model
avoids this. It also falls in with the established invest-
ment criterion under certainty, which is to choose invest-
ments so as to maximize present wealth.
One of the fundamental assumptions of equilibrium theory under
uncertainty, is that investors have homogeneous information
on the probability distributions. Lottery bonds offer a
unique property in this respect, as the probabilities may
be taken to be objectively given.
Other empirical tests of various mean/variance models for
securities markets nave been based on data from the stock
market.2)
2)
F. Black, M. Jensen, M. Scholes, "The Capital Asset
Pricing Model: Some Empirical Results", Studies in the
Theory of Capital Markets, edited by Michael Jensen,
Praeger, New York, 1972.
G.W. Douglas, "Risk in the Equity Markets: An Empirical
Appraisal of Market Eff±ciency", Yale Econ. Essays 9
(Spring 1969), pp. 3-45.
Eugene F. Fama and James D. MacBeth, "Risk, Return and
Equilibrium: Empirical Tests", Journal of Political Eco-
nomy, 1973, pp. 607-636.
I. Friend and M. Blume, "Measurement of Portfolio Perfor-
mance under Uncertainty", American Economic Review, v.60
(September 1970), pp. 561-575.
Terje Hansen, "A Quarterly Portfolio Allocation Model",
Discussion paper (mimeograpted), The Norwegian School
of ~conomics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1969.
M. Miller and M. Scholes, "Rates of Return in Relation
to Risk: A Re-Examination of some Recent Findings",
Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets", edited by
Michael Jensen, New York, Praeger 1972.
Investors have been assumed to make their forecasts on future
rates of return on the basis of historical data. It is well
accepted that this is a doubtful assumption. Given the stock
market data, it is, however, probably the most reasonable as-
sumption to make.
The conclusions of the empirical tests have not been in support
of the mean/variance formulation of the equilibrium model, or as
it is sometimes called, the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin model. An
alternative "two parameter portfolio model" appears to fare some-
what better.3) The hypotheses are both two-parametric, and it
is hard to see that the data are precise enough to justify a
discrimination between the two. Results which support a "two
parameter portfolio mOdel", are also felt therefore, to give some
indication that the S-L-M model is a reasonable hypothesis.
3) E.Fama, op.cit. p. 633.
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The Market Price of Risk 1,2
CORNELIUS M. SCHILBRED
The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
A mean-variance equilibrium model is tested against data from the Italian bond market.
General equilibrium models under uncertainty were first constructed by Allais [1] and
Arrow [2]. The model tested is of the class formulated by Borch [3], on the basis of works
by Markowitz [8] and Tobin [18], and developed further by Sharpe [17J, Lintner [6] and
Mossin [10].
The bonds used in the test are annuity bonds. These are bearer bonds in loans, where
the loan is repaid by a constant amount per period in cover of repayment of capital and
interest on the loan. A lottery is arranged before each payment date, in order to determine
which bonds shall be redeemed by the forthcoming repayment of capital. The bonds not
drawn for redemption then participate in the next lottery, which is held one period later.
A sequence of such lotteries is arranged, until all bonds in the loan have been redeemed, and
the full amount of capital in the loan has been repaid. An annuity bond thus has an
uncertain maturity. Its probability of redemption on a future date is given by the repay-
ment plan for the capital of the loan.
The certainty alternative which is considered relevant to the investors is investment in
Government bonds. With the market for Government bonds assumed to be in equilibrium,
this property is used to take account of the time dimension of investment in the annuity
bonds. The investors are then assumed to behave ¥1 accordance with the von Neumann
and Morgenstern theory [11J, and establish preferences over probability distributions of
present wealth. Such a behavioural assumption was tested earlier in an experiment [15],
and gives a reasonable description ofinvestor behaviour. Italian data were chosen, because
investors paid no taxes on income from capital gains and interest payments during the
period studied.
I. THE MEAN/VARIANCE EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
The mean/variance model assumes that mvestors choose between probability distributions
on the basis of their mean and variance. Borch [4] has then shown, that if the investors
behave according to the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory, investors have quadratic
utility functions for money or present wealth Uj(x) = X-CjX2, where X is money and c, is
a constant for each investor i. Further, Samuelson [13J has shown that a quadratic utility
function gives a good two-moment approximation to any utility function. Expected utility
may then be written as
... (1)
where Ej is the mathematical expectation and sf is the variance of investor j's portfolio.
The economy is Walrasian, so that investors consider prices as given and the set of
equilibrium prices is reached through a tatounement process. The n investors come to
the market with given amounts of initial wealth Wj (i = 1, ... , n). There are m different
1 First cersion received July 1972; final version received November 1972. (Eds.)
2 This study was made during a stay at INSEE, Paris. A more extensive report is published in Annales
de l'INSEE. I wish to thank Edmond Malinvaud and Pascal Mazodier for most valuable discussions and
suggestions. The data was kindly provided by Banca d'Italia, Roma.
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securities, labelled j, on the market, and investor i holds a fraction z;i of security j in equi-
librium. The market clearing conditions are
~>Ij= 1, U = 1, ... , m) ... (2)
;
so that the total number of securities on the market is given. With the security prices Pi'
investors have the budget constraints
I ZijP}- W; = 0 (i = 1, ... , n). . ..(3)
j
The investors then behave so as to choose a portfolio of securities which maximizes the
expected utility of quadratic uti1ity functions. The mathematical expectation of a portfolio
is
E; = I Zi}Jlj (i = 1, ... , n) ... (4)
j
where Jl} is the expected present value of security j. The total variance of a portfolio is
Sf = I I ZijZ;kUjlt (i = 1, ... , n) ., .(5)
j k
where uilt is the covariance between the present values of securities j and k,
To maximize expected utility, subject to the budget constraints (3), form the Lagran-
geans:
L; = I zijJlj-c;[I I ZijZ;kUjk+(I zijJl)2]+..1.;[I ZijPj- W;] (i = 1, ... , n).
j j k i j
Setting the partial derivatives equal to zero:
~Li = Jlj-2c;[I ZikUjk+ Jlj L zijJli] +..1.;Pj= 0
UZij k j
(i = 1, , n)
(j= 1, , m).
Dividing by C;, summing over i and using the market clearing conditions (2):
... (6)
The hypothesis is that there exists a security such that its value is given with certainty.
Money may be such a security, or numeraire. Taking this to be the security labelled
m, Pm = Jlm and U mk = 0 for all k, so that the equation for security m is:
... (7)
and substitution from (7) for L ..1.dc;in the-other m-I equations (6) yields:
l
JliLl -2LUjk-2JljLJlj+Pi[2LJli- L1J =0.
i ci k j j i C;
This gives the equilibrium prices for the m securities:
1
Pj = Jlj- 1 I Ujk (j = 1, ... , m)






SCHILBRED THE MARKET PRICE OF RISK
"I is the market price of risk. With given utility functions and probability distributions, "I
is a given quantity, and it is the same for all securities on the market.
The reinsurance formulation of (8) can be found in [3, p. 433]. In the Sharpe-Lintner-
Mossin one-period model, the quantities on the right-hand side of (8) are for end of period
distributions and utility functions. Their model discounts the right-hand side of (8) by
(1 + R) - 1, where R is the risk-free rate of interest. This can be seen as discounting the
certainty-equivalent of the end of period distributions to the present, and gives the link
between the two formulations of the mean/variance equilibrium model.
11. PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS AND THE ITALIAN BONDS
The mean/variance equilibrium model will be tested against the transactions prices for
bonds issued by Instituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI), and bonds issued by the Italian Treas-
ury, the Bueno del Tesoro Poliennali or BTP bonds. IMI raises funds for its operations
on the Italian bond market, and operates in close understanding with the Italian Govern-
ment [12]. When IMI opens a new loan, it issues and sells bonds on the market. The sale
of bonds ceases when the total amount of the loan has been raised.
IMI's loans are annuities, which means that a constant amount is paid per year in
interest and repayment of capital. There will normally be a large number of bonds on the
market, and onlya fraction of these are redeemed by IMI on each payment date. The fraction
of the outstanding bonds to be redeemed in a forthcoming capital repayment, is equal to
the ratio between the amount to be repaid and the total amount of the loan still outstanding.
Every IMI bond on the market, therefore, carries a number, and a lottery is arranged before
each payment date, in order to determine which bonds IMI shall be obliged to redeem.
The numbers drawn are published, so that the bond holders may deliver their bonds and
receive an amount to cover interest and the face value of the bonds. Bonds which have not
been drawn for redemption receive only the coupon rate of interest and participate in the
next lottery.
The fact that the bonds are redeemed through lotteries where the amounts to be drawn
are fixed in advance, provides each bond with objectively given probabilities as to its future
date of redemption. If a bond carries the coupon r per period, and there will be q future
instalments paid, the probability that the annuity bond will be drawn for redemption at the
s-th lottery is [14, p. 47]:
r(l+ry-1 .«sr. q) = , (s = 1, 2, ... , q). ...(9)
(l+r)q-l
It is this lottery risk for which we shall attempt to estimate the market price. The ideal
situation for measurement would have been if1MI had also issued bonds with fixed matu-
rities, in a sufficient number so that there would be one loan maturing on each instalment
day of the annuity loans, and with coupons matching those of the annuities. Theset of
possible transaction prices for each annuity bond could then be obtained directly as the
transaction prices of the corresponding fixed maturity, or certainty equivalent bonds, and
with the probabilities (9) the first two moments required for estimation of y in (8) could
have been computed.'
IMI does not, however, issue bonds with fixed maturities. The certainty alternative
to IMI bonds, which is considered relevant to Italian investors, is investment in BTP bonds.
The Italian Treasury issues BTP bonds with about yearly intervals, and it only issues bonds
with fixed maturities.
1 The transaction price is equal to the quoted market price plus simple interest at the coupon rate. If IX is
the fraction of the coupon period which has elapsed since the last coupon payment simple interest is equal
to ar, By adding simple interest to the market price, bond brokers are in fact correcting for a mathematical
error made in the computation of bond values tables. The resulting transactions price between buyer and
seller is a close approximation to the present value of the bond, where a constant rate of interest i, per period
is used in the discounting. See (16).
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The maturity dates of the BTP bonds do not in general coincide with the dates of the
instalment payments for IMI bonds. In order to get the transaction prices for the hypo-
thetical BTP bonds with the proper maturities, yield curves were estimated on the basis of
the observed BTP prices.
For a bond with fixed maturity at time t, [I] coupon payments will be made, where Et]
is the closest integer larger than t. At time I the bond holder will receive payment for the
par value of the bond plus coupon. The present value of a bond is then present value of
the coupon payments and the par value:
B(r, i, I) = (1+0"[ ~ r (_l_.)fJ + 1, (_I_.)[I]J 100
fJ=1 1+1 1+1
= (1+i)«[! + ~(_l_)[t]J100.
i i 1+ i
Where 100 = par value of bonds quoted.
...(10)
t = time to maturity measured in units of coupon period (real number).
(x = Et] - t, so that (1-0:) is the fraction of coupon period until the first forth-
coming coupon payment (see note, p. 285).
i = yield per coupon period of bond with fixed maturity at time I (per cent).
r = coupon paid per period (per cent).
B(r, i, t) = present value of a bond.
To derive the yield to maturity for a BTP bond on an observation date, an algorithm
was used. This would obtain a value for i, such as to give a bond value by (10), sufficiently
accurate to fall within the accuracy limits of the observed price for the BTP bond.' The
number of BTP bonds on the market at any time was 8 or 9, and the time to maturities
between 0 and 9 years. A rectangular hyperbola was fitted to the set of computed yields
giving a yield curve
... (11)
where s is the normally distributed error term with expectation zero and given variance.
This yield curve for Government bonds represents the market yield on relatively
certain future payments on an observation date. The estimated yield curve and (10) were
used to find what the market price would have been for a lottery bond if it had been known
with certainty that it would mature on a particular future redemption date. With this set
of possible present values which the lottery bond may have on a day, and the probabilities,
the expected present value of a lottery 'pond is:
q
J1.B = L B(r, i, t)· gir, q)
s = [
... (12)
where s is the lottery arranged before the instalment date I. The variance of the lottery is
q
O'~ = L [B(r, i, t)-jJ.B]2·g.(r, q).
s = 1
...(13)
The IMI bonds had maturities between 0 and 19 years, with expected maturity of 12
years for the bond with the longest maturity observed. This means that the BTP yield
curves used were well outside the observed value for time to maturity for BTP bonds.
Estimated 61 in (11) may be taken as the long term yield for Government bonds, and the
standard errors for 61 were small, with the lowest r-statistic 16 = 49·63. As the correspond-
ing theoretical value for 16(0'05) = 2'45, 61 should give a reliable indication of the market
long-term yield for relatively certain future payments.
1 The computational procedure and estimation of yield curves is discussed in [16]. [7] and [9] have
studied the construction of yield curves for BTP bonds in more detail.
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As regards the covariances required by hypothesis (8), these are for outcomes in lotteries
for different loan issues. There is no link between the series of lotteries, so all lottery
covariances will be zero. There is, however, one source of covariation between the payout
in the different loans, which comes from the possible uncertainty of IMI's ability to meet its
future payment obligations. This source of uncertainty has to be taken into account
because the observable market prices for alternative, relatively certain claims are for BTP
(Government) bonds with fixed maturities, and not for IMI bonds. The lottery risk may,
therefore, not be the only source of relative uncertainty. There may also be a difference in
default risk between IMI and BTP bonds. By issuing and selling bonds, IMI gives claims to
its probability distribution of cash flow. If this probability distribution is given, the sum
of the amounts paid to the holders of securities issued by IMI must be equal to the amount
paid by IMI under a particular event:
ajl", = L ajllw
I
... (14)
where ajl,., = amount payable from firm j (in this case IMI) at time t if the event w occurs.
ajllw = amount payable by firm j to the holder of security I at time t in the event w.
Given the market for claims to be paid with certainty, the market price of £1 payable
at time t, v" is given. A set of payments then has a present market value aj1w = r.,ajltl<.v"
and likewise ajw = r.,aj,14'v,. From (14) then follows
<» = L ajl""
I
... (15)
i.e. that the present market value of firm j if the cash flow IV occurs, is equal to the sum of
the present market values under the event w of the I securities issued by firm j.
Using (15) it can be shown that
... (16)
}J. j = expected present value of firm j.
}J.jl = expected present value of security I issued by firm j.
From (15) and (16) it follows in turn that
L L /'10 = er;
I 0
... (17)
Plo = covariance between the present values of securities I and 0 issued by firm j.
(17) says that the sum of the variances and covariances between the probability distributions
for payments to the holders of securities issued by firm j is equal to the total variance of
firmj's cash flow distribution. So that by issuing securities, the firm is distributing its cash
flow variance to its securities. If there is uncertainty associated with firm ps cash flow,
therefore, some or all the variances and covariances between its securities will be non-zero.
For IMI as a bond issuer, the variances and covariances will be equal for all bonds if
there is an immediate danger of ilIiquidity for 1M!. Such default will mean that the same
percentage amount of the face values of the bonds are paid to the bond holders, as all
bonds have equal priority to IMI's assets. A more long-term possibility of default will,
however, mean that the total variance of IMI's cash flow distribution is spread unevenly
over its bonds, with the long-term loans getting a larger proportion of the default risk. In
this case it is probable that all the possible cash flows foreseen for IMI are such that they
permit the institution to meet its short term payment obligations, and then there will be no
default risk for bonds in loans with a short time to final maturity.
If there is uncertainty as to the future cash payments to be made by IMI, and there
are also other securities on the market with uncertain future cash flows. it may be that not
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all the covariances between the cash flow distributions on the market are zero. The co-
var iance between the present market values of firms j and k is (J jk' and by (15) and (16) is
given as
... (18)
which says that the sum of the covariances for firm j's securities I with firm k, is equal to
the covariance between firms j and k.
In the case of default risk for IMI, it is the distribution of the total risk, Ujk (allj and k),
over its securities, PI'" which enters in the determination of the relative market prices of
the securities. This default risk enters together with the lottery risk, so that the measured
uncertainty in terms of lottery variances may not be a measure of the total uncertainty
required by the hypothesis of equilibrium prices (8).
One may, however, have that a high (low) lottery risk occurs together with a low (high)
default risk. This depends on the spread in the market values of the certainty equivalent
bonds, the time to final maturity of the loan, and whether there is an immediate or more
long-term risk of default. Without knowing the investors' perception of the future of the
Italian Government and IMI on each observation date, it is, therefore, not possible to say,
a priori, how default risk affects the estimation of the market price of risk.
Ill. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The years 1958to 1963were chosen as the observation period.' This should be a long enough
period to permit a test of the stability over time of the equilibrium price hypothesis (8).
Because they are the most active trading months, May, June and September of each year
were used as the months from which to draw a random sample of a total of 40 trading days.
For the IMI loans outstanding on these days, the loan information [5J published by
IMI was used together with the estimated yield curves for BTP bonds, to compute the
expected present values J1jd and variances U;d for bond j on observation date d. Simple
interest at the coupon rate was added to the observed market prices to obtain the transaction
prices Pjd'
As the equilibrium model is specified for a given amount of securities, a sales dummy
sd = 1: if bonds in the issue are on sale from IMI,
sd = 0: otherwise
was used to account for a possible effect of bond sales on the observed market prices. To
test the hypothesis of a market price for risk I'd' it is useful to introduce the concept of risk
premium 1tjd = J1jd-Pjtl and to rewrite (8) as 1tjd = YP;d' As the lotteries may not be the
only source of uncertainty, we shall assume that a difference in default risk between the
BTP bonds and IMI bonds affects all IMI bonds alike. So that a difference in default risk
will manifest itself through a non-zero intercept in the regression:
1tjd = ad+Ydu;d+hdSdjd+e.
Using all observations to test this hypothesis, the following estimates were obtained r'
1t = 2·46 +0'34u2+3'07sd
(0,184) (0,027) (0,252) ... (19)
(R2 = 0,50, 361 obs., ESS = 1857·89)
This result tends to confirm the mean/variance equilibrium model. The estimated market
1 The Italian tax laws were changed in 1971, and the observation period should be chosen well before
any effects of expected future changes in tax laws influenced relative bond prices.
2 The level of significance chosen is 5 per cent. The standard error is given in parenthesis below each
estimate.
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price of risk is significantly different from zero. The significance of the sales dummy sug-
gests that IMI on the whole experienced three percentage points lower prices for bonds in
issues which were on sale, compared to the prices for bonds closed series. The significant
intercept means that IMI bonds traded at prices which were about two and a half percentage
points lower than the prices which would have been paid for similar bonds if they had been
issued by the Italian Treasury.
The regression (19) explains about half of total variance, so that there may also be
other factors which affect the observed risk premiums. The positive intercept points to
the question of a possible default risk, which has not been accounted for in the computed
means and variances for IMI bonds.
It may, therefore, have affected the estimated market price of risk that the yield curves
were for BTP bonds, and not for IMI bonds with fixed maturities. The form of the BTP
yield curve should reflect expectations about future changes in interest rates, commodity
prices, BTP default risk, and other relevant economic factors. A difference in default risk
between BTP and IMI bonds would affect the computed expected present values and
variances through (10). The effect would depend on the coupon r, and time to maturity, t,
of the annuity bonds. As both t and r have already been used in the computations of fl jd
and a}d' there is no direct way to study a possible difference in default risk. To enter t
and r as explanatory variables together with O"7d causes an identification problem. The
question of default risk is, however, important and the introduction of dummy variables
for the coupons of the different IMI bonds was chosen as the method of studying it.
During the period, IMI had outstanding bonds with 5%, 5·5~~and 6% coupons, and the
two dummy variables are:
Cl = 1: if 6% coupon
Cl = 0: otherwise
C2 = 1: if 5% coupon
C2 = 0: otherwise.
This gave the regression
1l = 2·06 +0'47a2-O'87C1 +2·38C2+2·95sd.
(0,429) (0'023) (0'409) (0'447) (0,192)
(R2 = 0'72, 361 obs., ESS = 1048·51)
It is evident from (20) that the use of BTP yield curves poses a problem, as both coupon
dummies are significantly different from zero, and the coefficient of determination has
increased considerably. The introduction of coupon dummies has increased the estimated
market price of risk. Studying the three.subsamples:
6% coupon: tt = 1·65 +0·5()q2+0·38sd
(0'085) (0'013) (0,137) ... (20.1)
(R2 = 0'88, 264 obs., ESS = 199·90)
... (20)
5·5% coupon: 'Tt = 0·68 +0·21a2+9·68sd
(0,216) (0,228) (2'541)
(R2 = 0'99, 19 obs., ESS = 8·94)
5% coupon: 1l = 1·65 +3·78a2+4·12sd.
(0'502) (0,278) (0·516)
(R2 = 0'74, 78 obs., ESS = 273·5)
The estimated market prices of risk are quite different for the three bond groups, and for
the 5·5% coupons the 1s's% is no longer significant. There were only 5'5% bonds on the
market on 19 of the 40 days of observation. Of the two 5·5 '/~ issues, one issue matured in
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considerably, whereas the lottery risk apparently played an insignificant role in price
determination.
As regards the 5% coupon bonds, the number of such loans on the market varied
between 1 and 3 during the observation period. Three new 5% loans were issued, and the
sale of these had a significant effect on market prices. The Y5% is particularly high, 11
times larger than the estimated market price of risk for the sample as a whole. The 61 for
the estimated yield curves for BTP bonds was near 5% or slightly lower in most of the
periods. 61 may be taken as the long term rate of interest on Government bonds, and
the fact that it was close to the coupon of the 5% bonds means that there is little spread
in the set of possible present values of these bonds, which gives small computed variances.
The 5% coupon bonds may therefore be the ones which are most affected by the use of the
BTP yield curves, and the high Y s% should be interpreted with this in mind.
TABLE 1
1TJ.% = a.+Ydo].+h.sdj•
Number 8 I 14 25 36
Dated 11.5.59 19.5.60 -I 19.5.61 11.5.62 3.6.63
ad 2-36· 0·88· I 1,55- 3·82· 1-81
(0'446) (0'1181) I (0'271) (0'263) (0'635)
Y. 0'78· 0·59· 0·57· 0·58· 0-47·
(0'112) (0'023) (0'045) (0'052) (0-063)
h. -0,01 0·20 -0,08 0'33 0·63
(0,480) (0'158) (0'524) (0'550) (0'661)
R2 0·93 0'99 0·98 0·98 0·98ESS 1·3270 0·1217 0·7592 0·8415 0·7418
Number of
observations 7 7 7 7 5
The 6% coupons dominate in terms of the number of observations, and it is for this
group that one probably has the most reliable estimate of the market price of risk, Y6% = 0·5.
It is a fair difference between the BTP yields and the 6% coupon, which gives variation in
the computed (12. The number of 6% bonds on the market at any time varied between 4
and 7.
The above suggests that a market price of risk exists, and we shall test whether it was
stable over time. Using (20), (20.1), (20.2) and (20.3) to test the homogeneity acrosscoupons
of the coefficients in n = a+Y(12+h'sd, the statistic F4'352 = 103·29 clearly rejects this.
The stability test is, therefore, limited to the subsample of bonds carrying a 6% coupon.
One observation date was chosen for each year, with the date closest to the 15th May being
picked arbitrarily.
Significant estimates are marked with asterisks. Testing the stability of the market
price of risk over yearly intervals, the null hypothesis is nJJo = ad +Y(17d+hdSd jd, against the
alternative hypothesis above.
Introducing the dummy variables:
d _ {I if the observation is from the first date
t 1 - 0 if the observation is from the second date
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we have the regressions in Table 2:
TABLE 2





1 and 8 8 and 14 14 and 25 25 and 36





al 2·76 0·92 1·54 I 4·04
I
«(}291) «(}171) (0'226) (0'269)
a2 0·65 1'52 3-84 1·39
I
(0'297) «(}174) «(}207) (0'473)
a3 I 0'21 0·23 -(}09 0·61
I
«(}381) (0'272) (0'485) (0'623)
a4
I
(}04 -0,11 0·34 I
(}34
(0'428) (0'365) I (0'479) «(}554)
I !R2 I (}96 0'99 0·98 I 0·97, ,










As FI'S(O'05) = 5·32 and FI•6(O·05) = 5·99, the market price of risk was stable over
each one year period. A similar test for the fiveyears gave ESS)o = 5·9982 with 33 observa-
tions, for the null hypothesis. With ESS)" = 3·7912 for the alternative, the statistic is
F4'18 = 2'62, against F4•18(O·05) = 2·93. So that the market price of risk was also stable
over the five years studied. These tests, therefore, indicate both short and more long run
stability of the market price of risk.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the formation of market prices on contracts in uncertain future
payments. For the case of certainty, the well known criterion is to choose investments so as
to maximize present wealth. Given a market for certainty claims, the mean/variance
equilibrium model under uncertainty then gives a testable hypothesis on observable trans-
action prices for securities.
The mean/variance equilibrium model was tested against data from the Italian bond
market. The equilibrium model was supported. The estimated market price of risk appears to
be close to £0·5 per unit of variance. The market price of risk was stable over the five-year
period studied, and also over one-year subintervals.
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The intention of the papers has been to obtain information
on individual behaviour under risk and to study the market
prices for contracts in uncertain future payments. Bearer's
bonds in loans where the repayment is made through a series
of lotteries offer a godd opportunity for such studies. The
interesting characteristic of these bonds is that the lotter-
ies provide a set of probabilities, which may be considered
as objectively given data in the valuation of the bonds.
All investors may further be said to have identical informa-
tion on the probabilities.
The intention of chapter I was to classify the various types
of bonds and to derive the probabilities. Some commonly ob-
servable rules of thumb which are used by investors, give an
indication that lottery bonds offer interesting possibili-
ties for empirical testing of uncertainty theories. The na-
tural next step was then to design a more extensive experiment,
which is reported in chapter 11. In this experiment the main
result was that typical investor behaviour is in accordance
with the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory. The typical in-
vestors are risk averse, and their Arrow-Pratt absolute risk
aversion functions increase with increasing wealth. This
admits for example the cummulated normal distribution and
the quadratic utility function for money.
Emphasis has been laid on the treatment of the time dimen-
sion. The various cash flows which a lottery bond may offer
span different lengths of time into the future. As the util-
ity functions were defined for money, the parallell consept
for ranking of investments is present value. For each
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Bueno del Tesoro Poliennali - BTP bonds.
Coupon for all bonds: 5% per year. Fixed redemption.
Maturity dates of issues:
Loan no. Maturit;l
1 l. 4. 1960
2 l. l. 1961
3 l. l. 1962
4 l. l. 1963
5 l. 4. 1964
6 l. 4. 1965
7 l. 4. 1966
8 l. l. 1968
9 1.10. 1966
10 l. 4. 1969
11 l. l. 1970
12 l. l. 1971
Semi-annual coupon payments.
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Computation of mean and variance for a bond.
It will be shown by way of an example how the mean and vari-
ance are computed for bond on an observation date. The bond
chosen is from loan no. 8 and the observation date Sept. 10,
1963. Bonds in loan no. 8 carry 6% coupon, payable semiannu-
ally. Lotteries are arranged every Jan. 15, and the subse-
quent repayments of the loan are made every April 1. On Sept.
10 the first forthcoming repayment in the loan was to be made
on April 1, 1964. And the final repayment on April 1, 1970.
Yield on alternative, safe investment is given by the esti-
mated yield curve for BTP bonds on the observation date:
i = 4,645 - O,077/t. The set of certainty alternative values
for the lottery bond is obtained by computing the value for i
from the regression above for each possible time to maturity
for the bond. The obtained value for i together with the t-
value are then used in the formula for the transaction price
in chapter Ill:
(2)
to get the set of alternativa bond values.
In the following figure is given the estimated yield curve for
BTP bonds on the observation date Sept. 10, 1963, together with
the computed yields. In the diagram below are the repayment
dates of loan no. 8 and the set of certainty alternative values
for an IMI bond in loan no. 8. From the set of certainty al-
ternative values and the lottery probabilities may be computed
the mean ~ = 107,28 and variance 02 = 5,1143.
The observed market price of the bond is L99,60. The first
forthcoming coupon payment is due on Oct. 1, and on that day
a bond holder will receive a coupon payment of 6%/2 = 3%.
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The remaining time to coupon payment is 20 days, or 20/180 =
0,11 of a coupon period. The accrued simple interest is then
L3(1-0,11) = L2,66, and the transaction price is p = L99,60 +
L2,66 = L102,26. The observed risk premium is then
IT = ~ - p = 107,28 - 102,26 = L5,02.
From the enclosed set of data may be seen that the computed
risk premium for a bond is loan no. 8 on Sept. 10, 1963 was
L5,0264. The risk premiums are thus represented with more
decimal points than the observed prices on IMI bonds. The
alternative would be to truncate or to round the computed
figures to an accuracy of two decimal points. It was chosen
not to round or truncate figures in any intermediate step of
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81.
Istituto Mobiliare Italiano - IMI
Variables
LO = Loan number
RPR = Risk premium
VAR = Variance
SD = Sales dummy
SD = 1 - bonds on sale from IMI
SD = 0 - bonds not on sale
6-c = 6 - coupon
Cl and
C2 = coupon dummies
Cl = 1 if coupon is equal to 6%
Cl = 0 otherwise
C2 = 1 if coupon is equal to 5%
C2 = 0 otherwise
82.
OBS.NO. 1 DATE li. 5.59.
LO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RPR 0.8864 1.6386 3.4347 4.1756 3.2603 5.0830 7.1093 5.9652 8.0793
VAR 0.0016 0.0397 1.7855 2.2245 1.2347 4.0278 6.6932 3.5312 6.9382
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
6-C 1.000·) 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cl 0.(; 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C2 ldOOC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 2 DATE 22. 5.59.
LO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RPR 0.9232 1.4610 3.1644 3.8282 2.8315 4.9250 6.9311 5.7401 8.0015
VAR 0.0007 0.0480 1.9251 2.3985 1.3306 4.3474 7.2392 3.8142 7.5169
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
6-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cl 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 3 DATE 10. 6.59.
LO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RPR -0.2267 1.0909 1.8849 2.5894 1.7557 3.5699 5.2939 4.4216 6.1444
VAR 0.0009 0.0439 1.8679 2.3258 1.2910 4.2149 7.0153 3.6963 7.2827
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
6-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cl 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
C2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 4 DATE 17. 6.59.
.0. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
.PR -0.3242 1.0957 1.8993 2.5787 1.7605 3.6527 5.7136 4.1902 6.6189
'AR 0.0003 0.0463 2.0235 2.5219 1.3987 4.5736 7.6276 4.0153 7.9297
.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
r-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
.1 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
.2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 5 DATE 28. 9.59.
.0. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(PR -0.2502 1.1277 2.0336 2.2690 1.5740 3.2355 4.4524 3.8840 5.8352 2.9060
fAR 0.0431 0.0107 1.2337 1.6194 0.9019 2.8596 4.8254 2.5529 4.9794 0.4311
;0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000
)-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
:1 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
:2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
83.
OBS.NO. 6 DATE 3. 5.60.
LO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 0.4160 0.2302 1.3345 1.9203 0.3795 3.1825 5.4354 3.5633 6.3083 3.627f
VAR 0.0000 0.0140 1.6765 2.2019 1.0446 4.4479 8.0175 5.0522 10.0271 o .009L
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.000(
6-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000(
Cl 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000(
OBS.NO. 7 DATE 10. 5.60.
LO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 0.87(}6 0.9783 1.35-68 2.0886 1.0030 3.2943 5.4337 3.7715 6.0995 3.6398
VAR 0.0000 0.0130 1.6574 2.1776 1.0329 4.3977 7.9248 4.9954 9.9089 0.0061
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 le0000 0.0 1.0000
6-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000e
Cl 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
:2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000e
OBS.NO. 8 DATE 19. 5.60.
LO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 1.4212 0.5835 1.7713 2.2999 1.3180 3.6513 5.7805 3.9256 6.5406 3.6891
VAR 0.0000 0.0091 1.6410 2.1598 1.0238 4.3602 7.8570 4.9549 9.8194 0.0032
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 le0000 0.0 l.oooe
6-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000e
:1 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 le0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
OBS.NO. 9 DATE 27. 5.60.
LO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 1.4955 0.5551 1.8983 2.5672 1.5798 3.7883 6.1589 4.3006 7.2430 3.9573VAR 0.0000 0.0097 1.8390 2.4232 1.1471 4.8988 8.8564 5.5724 11.0870 0.0465
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0..-..0 0.0 1.0000 le0000 0.0 1.000e
6-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000e
Cl 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 l.oooe
OBS.NO. 10 DATE 20. 9.60.
La. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10RPR 1.5613 0.5352 0.9639 2.0064 0.8347 3.1148 4.9872 3.7589 6.2997 2.976C
VAR 0.0000 0.0000 1.7162 2.3472 lel119 4.6818 8.5617 5.3921 10.7111 0.0182
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 leOOOO 0.0 1.000(
6-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000e
Cl 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Q.O 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.00De
84.
OSS.NO. 11 DATE 23. 9.60 •
.0. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
~PR 1.5806 -0.5176 0.8628 1.9832 0.9340 2.9662 5.1784 3.5919 6.1610 2.9838
IAR 0.0000 0.0000 1.6137 2.2404 1.0618 4.4425 8.1564 5.1414 10.1979 0.0047;0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.000e
~-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000e
:1 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
:2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000e
OSS.NO. 12 DATE 26 • 9.60.·'
.0. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
~PR 1.7285 -0.5734 0.4088 1.6397 0.6219 2.6915 4.7656 3.2375 5.7563 2.7411
JAR 0.0000 0.0000 1.4464 2.0952 0.9936 4.0898 7.6076 4.8018 9.5026 0.0006
;0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000
;-C 1.0000 0.5000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000e
:1 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
:2 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
OSS.NO. 13 OATE 5. 5.61 •
.0. . 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
~PR 0.7366 2.8103 1.7336 3.9553 6.9440 4.8189 8.2223 4.9872
JAR 1.5492 2.2086 0.8092 5.1667 10.2882 6.0307 13.3012 0.3100
;0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000
;-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
:1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
:2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
OSS.NO. 14 DATE 19. 5.61.-
_0. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
~PR 2.0964 3.1977 1.5011 4.5547 7.0149 5.1471 8.4519 5.2524
VAR 1.4670 2.0917 0.7667 4.8895 g.7205 5.7050 12.5564 0.2204
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
:1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
OSS.NO. 15 OATE 24. 5.61.
_0. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 1.9633 2.7301 1.5804 4.0281 6.6173 4.7378 7.9404 5.2329
VAR 1.3445 1.9169 0.7031 4.4747 8.8749 5.2186 11.4479 0.1136
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000
b-C' 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
OBS.NO. 16 DATE ~5. 5.61.-
La. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 1.9150 2.6736 1.5352 3.9576 6.5181 4.6596 7.7260 5.0407
VAR 1.3163 1.8764 0.6885 4.3791 8.6798 5.1061 11.1921 0.0936
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 le 0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
OBS.NO. 17 DATE 26. 5.61.
La. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 1.9277 2.6935 1.5453 3.8895 6.5748 4.6982 7.7959 5.0960
VAR 1.3406 1.9116 0.7012 4.4616 8.8483 5.2029 11.4132 0.1106
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
OBS.NO. 18 DATE 21. 6.61.·
La. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 2.6188 2.6318 1.8476 4.5123 6.7115 5.0604 7.8638 5.5225
VAR 1.2936 1.8599 0.6804 4.3360 8.6119 5.0611 11.1003 0.0783
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 le 0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
OBS.NO. 19 DATE 4. 9.61.
LO. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 2.1399 2.8905 1.8112 4.5567 7.2759 5.1518 8.8758 6.0515VAR 1.6464 2.4180 0.8838 5.6201 11.3085 6.6164 14.6408 0.4484
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
::2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
OBS.NO. 20 DATE 13. 9.6le-
LO. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10RPR 2.7178 2.8770 1.63B 4.6638 7.5717 5.4185 8.9426 6.4173
VAK 1.6806 2.4824 0.9081 5.7605 11.6179 6.7941 15.0483 0.5087
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 O. o 0.0 0.0 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 le 0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
86.
OBS.NO. 21 DATE 18. 9.61.
!.O. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RPR 1.8556 3.0164 1.7590 5.0227 7.7101 5.5328 8.7485 6.2105
VAR 1.6853 2.5351 0.9271 5.8556 11.8769 6.9422 15.3885 0.5580
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
DBS.NO. 22 DATE 25. 9.s r..
LO. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RPR 2.0043 3.0750 1.9079 4.2573 7.3134 5.1126 8.3960 6.1362 6.9874
VAR 1.3680 2.3687 0.8661 5.2531 11.0651 6.4784 14.3181 0.3950 0.3703
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
DBS.NO. 23 DATE 28. 9.61.
!_ O. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RPR 2.4845 2.8185 1.7438 4.5980 7.1357 5.0207 8.2287 6.2141 6..9341
VAR 6.2641 2.3995 0.8774 5.7321 11.2135 6.5632 14.5139 0.4218 0.3960
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
OBS.NO. 24 DATE 29. 9.61.
LO. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RPR 1.1013 2.8892 1.5730 4.0371 7.4665 4.8727 8.4168 6.2864 7.2123
VAR 3.3781 2.5724 0.9410 7.2658 12.0559 7.0450 15.6240 0.5899 0.5573
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
b-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.1>000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
OBS.ND. 25 DATE H. 5.62.
LO. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RPR 3.8753 4.9629 3.5869 6.1455 8.8671 6.8787 9.8333 7.4278 8.9150
VAR 0.7901 1.2869 0.2801 3.6867 8.1866 4.4420 10.9125 0.1202 0.1349
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
OBS.NO. 26 DATE 4. 6.62.
LO. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11RPR 2.7359 3.0180 2.2540 4.6812 7.2679 5.3560 8.5161 7.2400 8.0150VAR 0.7864 1.2595 0.2773 3.6030 7.9667 4.3253 10.6229 0.1077 0.1230
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000' 1.0000
OBS.NO. 27 DATE 20. 6.62.
LO. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RPR 1.3345 2.7478 1.1286 3.8912 6.2338 4.4500 7.4545 6.7016 6.8770
VAR 0.6567 1.0450 0.2310 2.9834 6.5607 3.5732 8.7297 0.0080 0.0092
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
OBS. NO. 28 DATE 22. 6.62.
LO. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RPR 1.6506 2.4130 0.9951 3.6547 6.0442 4.2626 6.9633 6.5189 6.6921
VAR 0.6551 1.0423 0.2305 2.9753 6.5430 3.5633 8.7067 0.0075 0.0087
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
OBS.NO. 29 DATE 21. 6.62.
LO. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RPR 1.6565 2.2887 0.6618 3.0291 5.7133 4.0584 6.8773 6.4102 6.9917
VAR 0.6012 0.9558 0.2115 2.7256 5.9803 3.2623 7.9481 0.0005 0.0006
SO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
OSS.'NO. 30 DATE 6. 9.62.
.0. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
;PR 2.1388 2.9914 1.3288 4.4784 7.2683 5.1212 8.8004 8.8622 9.4382 10.0846
fAR 0.9325 1.5036 0.3307 4.3028 9.5718 5.1782 12.7983 0.3171 0.3682 0.5965
;0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
:'-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
:1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0
:2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.000e
88.
OBS.NO. 31 DATE 14. 9.62 •
.0. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
~PR 1.8631 2.6811 1.3664 4.1076 7.0231 5.0170 8.2395 9.1041 9.9728 9.9839
fAR 0.8597 1.3824 0.3047 3.9524 8.7661 4.7513 11.7057 O. 1908 0.2210 0.3579
;0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
)-c 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
:1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0
:2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
OBS.NO. 32 DATE 18. 9.62.-
.0. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
~PR 1.5301 2.2820 1.2588 3.6433 6.0729 4.4390 7.2651 8.3965 8.9636 9.1100
.JAR 0.7285 1.1648 0.2573 3.3257 7.3347 3.9890 9.7703 0.0394 0.0453 0.0733;0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.000e
!)-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.000e
:1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0
:2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
OBS.NO. 33 DATE 19. 9.62.
.0. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
~PR 1.5154 2.3601 1.2465 3.4095 5.9645 4.3486 7.2438 8.3431 8.6888 8.8282
JAR 0.7147 1.1431 0.2525 3.2629 7.1931 3.9137 9.5790 0.0300 0.0344 0.0557;0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 i.oooo 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
:,-C 0.0 0 e.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
:1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 l.OOOO 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0..., 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000_e.
OBS. NO. 34 DATE 7. 5.63.·
.0. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
~PR 4.1213 7.5904 5.2135 9.1123 9.6493 11.0773 11.5801 12.5183
vAR 4.9617 12.8117 6.2175 17.9457 t.4609 2. 1536 3.0424 12.4981;0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000
:1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
:2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
OSS.NO. 35 DATE 29. 5.63.
.0. 6 7 8 9 10 I 11 12 13
RPR 4.1585 7.4011 5.0533 8.9783 9.7178 i i. 1651 11.9985 12.2641
vAR 4.5061 11.5983 5.6408 16.2066 1.0765 le 5819 2.2318 10.7037
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000
:1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0:2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0
08S.NO. 36 DATE 3. 6.63.
LO. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
RPR 3.8241 7.0990 4.6507 8.7400 9.4456 10.5321 11.1390 11.5284 10.9370
VAR 4.3359 11.1459 5.4258 15.5640 0.9495 1.3944 1.9668 10.0696 17.1514
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 le 0000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
Cl 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 37 DATE 11. 6.63.
LO. 6 7 8 9 la 11 12 13 14
RPR 3.9876 7.5816 4..9114 9.4223 9.4314 11.2505 11.1218 12.0611 11.5188
VAR 4.7814 12.3321 5.9887 11.2525 1.2914 1.9020 2.6861 11.7516 19.0533
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 le 0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 le 0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 38 DATE 3. 9.63.
LO. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
RPR 4.1472 7.8011 5.0491 9.3909 10.7583 12.2888 12.9416 13.9277 1l.6810
VAR 5.0594 13.0651 6.3392 18.2905 1.4676 2.1640 3.0576 12.6921 20.2176
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 le 0000 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 39 DATE 4. 9.63.
LO. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
RPR 4.1384 1.5409 4.1360 8.8126 10.2174 12.1408 12.5111 13.3911 11.2053
VAR 4.5347 1l.6652 5.6762 16.2944 1.0405 105280 2.1550 10.6566 17.9641
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 O.AO 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 100000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 le 0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
OBS.NQ. 40 DATE la. 9.63.
LO. 6 7 8 9 la 11 12 13 14
RPR 3.9273 1.4996 5.0264 8.6852 10.0569 11.9404 12.2868 12.8102 10.8161
VAR 4.0887 10.4793 5.1128 14.6103 0.7199 1.0539 1.4839 8.9957 16.0695
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 100000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
90.
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08S.NO. 36 DATE 3. 6.63.
LO. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
RPR 3.8241 7.0990 4.6507 8.7400 9.4456 10.5321 11.1390 11.5284 10.9370
VAR 4.3359 11.1459 5.4258 15.5640 0.9495 1.3944 1.9668 10.0696 17.1514
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1- 0000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 37 DATE 11. 6.63.
1.0. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
RPR 3.9876 7.5876 4..9114 9.4223 9.4314 11.2505 11.7278 12.0611 11.5188
VAR 4.7814 12.3321 5.9887 17.2525 1.2914 1.9020 2.6861 11.7516 19.0533
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 38 DATE 3. 9.63.
LO. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14RPR 4.1472 7.8011 5.0491 9.3909 10.7583 12.2888 12.9416 13.9277 11.6870
VAR 5.0594 13.0651 6.3392 18.2905 1.4676 2.1640 3.0576 12.6921 20.2176
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
oBS.NO. 39 DATE 4. 9.63.
1.0. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14RPR 4.1384 7.5409 4.7360 8.8726 10.2174 12.1408 12.51ll 13.3911 11.2053
VAR 4.5347 11.6652 5.6762 16.2944 1.0405 1.5280 2.1550 10.6566 17.9641
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.-0 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
OBS.NO. 40 DATE 10. 9.63.
La. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
RPR 3.9273 7.4996 5.0264 8.6852 10.0569 11.9404 12.2868 12.8102 10.8161
VAR 4.0887 10.4793 5.1128 14. st 03 0.7199 1.0539 1.4839 8.9957 16.0695
SO 0.0 1.0000 0.0 0.0 1.0000 le 0000 0.0 1.0000 1.0000
6-C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0
Cl 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000
C2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0 0.0
90.
APPENDIX 11
"LE PRIX DU RISQUE",
ANNALES DE L'INSEE,
NO. 9, 1972, PP. 89-118.
• Cette etude a ete realiaee
durant un sejour au depar-
tement de la Recherche
a l'I.N.S.E.E., Paris.
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ANNALES DE L'I.N.S.E.E. - N'. 9-1972
Le prix
du risque '
par Cornelius M. SCHILBRED"
Cet article expose les resultats d'une etude
appllquee portant sur le prix de marche du
risque. les titres utilises sont les obligations
emlses en Italie par l'lstituto mobiliare italiano
(I.M.I.) ainsi que les obligations de l'Etat
italien.
l'I.M.1. emprunte de I'argent sur le marche
financier italien en emettant des obligations
dont le remboursement s'effectue a I'aide de
loteries qui determlnent quelles obligations
vont etre rernboursees a chaque echeance.
Comme les montants de ces remboursements
sont fixes a l'avance dans les conditions de
I'emprunt, on peut conslderer que les bons de
l'I.M.1. ont, en ce qul concerne les paiements
futurs, une distribution de probablllte qui est
une donnee pour les detenteurs de ces bons.
Afin de tester I'hypothese selon laquelle il
existe un prix de marche du risque, I'article
debute en speclfiant un rnodele d'equtlibre
instantane esperance-varlance. On suppose que
l'equivalent certain qu'il convient de conslderer
eomme une alternative aux obligations de
l'I.M.1. est constttue par les obligations emlses
par l'Etat Itallen, de sorte que le taux de ces
dernleres peut etre utilise pour tenir compte
du fait que les paiements relatifs a dlfferents
emprunts de I'I.M.I. ne sont pas simultanes.
On a alors vselectlonne au hasard quarante
[ours ouvrables pour la pertode 1958-1963,
et estlme la courbe de rendement pour les
bons d'Etat italien a chacune de ces dates.
Puis on a utilise les prcbabllltes assoclees aux
obligations de l'I.M.1. en circulation pour cal-
culer les esperances et les variances de leurs
valeurs actuallsees.
A I'aide de ces esperances et variances ainsi
calculees, on a pu effectuer dlfferents tests de
l'hypcthese selon laquelle il existe un prix
d'equtltbre du risque. Les tests tendent a
confirmer I'existence d'un tel prix du risque,
qul apparalt voisin de 0,5 lire par unite de
variance. On a trouve que ce prix du risque
etait stable sur I'ensemble de la perlode (cinq
ans) ainsi que sur des sous-intervalles d'une
annee.
Pour terminer, on a montre au moyen d'exem-
pies simples comment ce modele d'equillbre
esperance-varlance peut etre utilise dans les
decisions relatives aux investissements et a leur
financement, tout en soulignant certaines carac-




Il est bien connu qu' en aoenir certain une etureprise
doit choisir ses investissements de maniere a maximiser
la valeur actualisee de ses actifs [6, 11]. En ce qui
conceme le meilleur critere d'inoestissement en aoenir
incertain, l'approche la plus prometteuse semble etre
dans l'utilisation de modeles d'equilibre general en
incertitude. Les premiers modeles de cc type ont ete
construits par ALLAlS [1] et ARROW [2]. BOReR [3] a
etudie un tel modele pour le marche de la reassurance,
et a utilise le critere esperance-oariance dud MARKO-
VITZ et TOBIN [12, 26] pour etablir, a partir d'une
fonction d'utilit« qtuulratique, une formule explicite
du prix d' equilibre des titres en avenir incertain. Le
modele de BOReH est atemporel, et l'on peut done
considerer que les inoestisseurs expriment leurs prefe-
rences sur les distributions de probabilite de leur ri-
chesse actualisee.
Des deueloppements plus recents du modele d' equi-
libre esperance-oariance ont ete obtenus par SHARPE
[25]. LINTNER [9] et MOSSIN [15]. Leurs modeles sont
des modeles dune periode. Les inoestisseurs font leur
choix parmi les distributions de probabilite de leur
richesse finale de facon it minimiser la variance pour
une esperance mathematique fixee de leur richesse
finale, ou bien ils maximisent l' esperance d' une fonction
d'utilite quadrtuique. On suppose que taus les inoes-
tisseurs ont les memes distributions de probabilite, et
que toute acsioii« economique cesse d la fin de la periode.
Le modele esperance-oariance dune seule periode est
satisfaisant pour Z'analyse de certains problemes eco-
nomiques, tels que la composition du portefeuille-titres
d'un inoestisseur. Mais generalement, dans une ope-
ration d'investissement, une entreprise engage ses res-
sources pour plus d'une periode, et les investissements
qui s'offrens a elle ont des durees de vie differences.
Il est alors possible de considerer des modeles d plu-
sieurs periodes, tels que ceux de MOSSIN [16J et de
IiAKANSON [7], tout en supposant l' existence de pTefl~-
rences sur la richesse finale. Mais ces modeles deoiennent
vite fort compliques et semblent impossibles d tester
empiriquement.
1Le modele d'equilibre, .esperance-variance
Le modele esperance-variance suppose que les investisseurs choisissent
entre des distributions de probabilite en ne tenant compte que de leurs
esperances et de leurs variances. BORCH [4] a montre alors que, si les investis-
seurs se comportent en accord avec la theorie de VON NEUMANN et MORGEN-
STERN, ils possedent des fonctions d'utilite quadratiques en ce qui concerne
la monnaie ou la richesse actualisee :
Ut (x) = x - Ctx2
ou x est la monnaie et Ct une constante pour chaque investisseur i. De plus,
SAMUELSON [21] a montre qu'une fonction d'utilite quadratique donne une
approximation convenable pour les deux premiers moments de toute fonction
d'utilite. L'esperance de I'utilite s'ecrit alors :
(1) E [Ut (x)] = Ej - Ct (E? + S~)
ou Et est I'esperance mathematique et S~la variance du portefeuille du i!eme in-
vestisseur.
L'economie est Walrassienne, en ce sens que les investisseurs considerent
les prix comme donnes et que l'ensemble des prix d'equilibre est atteint par
un processus de tatonnement. Les n investisseurs arrivent sur le marche aver
une richesse initiale donnee Wj (i = 1, ... , n). n yam titres differents,
repreres par I'indice j = 1, ... , m. A I'equilibre, i'investisseur i detient une
fraction Ztj du titre j. Les conditions d'equilibre du marche sont, pour un
nombre fixe de titres
(2) ~ ZtJ=L (j = 1, ... , m)
Lorsque les titres ont pour prix Pi> les investisseurs ont pour contrainte
hudgetaire
(3) (i = 1, ... , n)
Les investisseurs choisissent alors un portefeuille de titres de facon a
maximiser I'esperance mathernatique de leurs fonctions dutiiite quadra-
tiques. L'esperance rnathematique d'un portefeuille est :
(4) (i = 1, ... , n)
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ou III est I'esperance de la valeur actualisee du titre j. La variance totale d'un
portefeuille est
(5) S? =I I Z'jZfkt1jJ:
k
(i = 1, ... , n)
OU t1iJ: est la covariance entre les valeurs actualisees des titres j et k,
Pour maximiser I'esperance mathematique de I'utilite sous la contrainte
budgetaire (3), formons les Lagrangiens :
t, = ~ Ztilll - et [I I Z'IZ(J:t1Ilt; + (I Z'1 III rJ + A((I ZtiPI - W,)
k
i= 1, ... , n
Annulant Ies donnees partieUes, il vient
~:1 = Ili - 2 c( [IZ(J: t1jlt;+ III I ZU Ill] + A(Pi = 0
k
i= 1, ... , n j=1, ... , m
Divisant par et, sommant par rapport a i et utilisant Ies conditions d'equi-
libre de marche (2), on obtient :
(6) j=1, ... , m
Faisons alors I'hypothese qu'il existe un titre dont la valeur est connue
avec certitude, par exemple la monnaie, ou un numeraire. Pour un tel titre,
que nous supposerons etre le m1eme, pm = fJ.m et t1mJ: = 0 pour tout k, de
sorte que I'equation (6) pour ce titre m s'ecrit :
(7)
Reportant dans (6) la valeur de ,~ ~ tiree de (7), on obtient alors les
~Ci
m - 1 equations :
ce qui donne le prix d'equilibre pour les m titres
Pi = III __ __ ~_1 __ - ,~ I'Jjk
'\'~-'\'lL-_2Ci _,1
j=l, ... , m
ou encore





y est le pm du risque a I'equilibre. Pour des fonctions d'utilite et des distri-
butions de probahilite donnees, y est une quantite fixee, la meme pour tous
ies titres.
La formulation (8) en termes de reassurance se trouve dans [3, p. 433].
Dans le modele a une periode de SHARPE-LINTNER-MosSIN,Ies quantites du
membre de droite dans (8) correspondent a des distributions de probabilite
et des fonctions d'utilite pour la periode terminale. Dans leur modele, le
membre de droite de (8) est divise par un facteur (1 + R) ou R est le taux
d'interet certain. Cela revient a prendre la valeur actualisee a la date presente
de I'equivalent-certain de la distribution de probabilite en fin de periode.
On voit ainsi clairement le lien qui existe entre les deux formulations du
modele d' equilihre esperance-variance.
2 Les distributions de probabiliteet les obligations italiennes
Nous allons tester le modele d'equilibre esperance-variance en utilisant
les prix auxquels sont echanges les obligations emises par l'Istituto mobiliare
italiano (I.M.I.) et les bons du Tresor italien, ou bueno del Tesoro poliennali
(bons B.T.P.).
L'I.M.I. {met des obligations garanties par I'Etat; son president est nom-
me par le President de la Republique, et 7 des 19 membres de son conseil
d'administration sont nommes par le Tresor italien [19]. Dans toutes ses
operations, l'I.M.I. semble agir en contact etroit avec le Gouvemement ita-
lien. L'I.M.I. finance ses operations en vendant des obligations sur le marche
italien. Lorsqu'il emet un nouvel emprunt, les obligations sont mises en vente
pendant une periode specifiee a I'avance a l'issue de laquelle remission est
close. Le remboursement de l'emprunt se fait selon un echeancier tel qu'a
chaque echeance, la somme des interets verses et des remboursements de
titres reste constante. Chaque obligation emise par l'I.M.I. porte un numero,
et tous les deux mois et demi environ, on organise une loterie dans cette tran-
che de facon a determiner quelles obligations rernbourser.
Du fait que les obligations sont remboursees selon des loteries OU le nombre
de titres a tirer est fixe a l'avance, chaque obligation est affectee d'une pro-
bahilite objective concemant sa date future de remboursement. Si une obli-
gation rapporte un interet r par periode, et si l'emission doit etre remboursee
en q periodes futures, la probabilite qu'une obligation donnee soit remboursee
par tirage apres la sleme loterie est [22, p. 47] :
(9) s = J, 2, ... , '!
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Ce que nous allons chercher a estimer, c'est le prix de marche de Cl' risque
qui tient au remboursement par loterie. La situation ideale aurait ete que
l'I.M.I. ait aussi emis suffisamment d'obligations a echeance fixee pour que
l'une de ces obligations vienne a echeance a chaque date de remboursement
des obligations cl echeance aleatoire tout en rapportant un taux d'interet
d'un meme montant.
L'ensemble des prix de transaction pour chaque obligation a echeance
aleatoire s'obtiendrait alors directement cl partir des prix de transaction des
obligations a echeance fixe (equivalents certains); les probabilites(9) per-
mettraient alors de calculer les deux premier moments necessaires pour I'esti-
mation de y dans (8) 1.
Mais il est de fait que l'I.M.I. n'emet pas d'obligations a echeance fixe.
L'alternative cl ces obligations de I'I.M.1. qui puisse jouer le role d'alternative
certaine pour les investisseurs italiens consiste en hons B.T.P. Le Tresor
italien emet ces bons B.T.P. a peu pres tous les ans, et il n'emet que des bons
a echeance fixe.
La date d'echeance des bons B.T.P. ne coincide generalement pas avec
les dates de mise en paiement des obligations I.M.I. Afin d'obtenir les prix
de transaction pour d'hypothetiques bons B.T.P. qui auraient I'echeance
convenable, des courbes de rendement ant ete estirnees sur la base des prix
observees de ces bons B.T.P.
Pour un ban a echeance fixe qui vient a echeance a la date t, [t] paiements
de coupons seront faits, [t] etant le nombre entier immediatement superieur
a t. A la date t, le detenteur de ce ban recoit en paiement la valeur nominale
du bon augmentee du coupon. La valeur actualisee d'un bon est done egale
a la valeur actualisee de la valeur nominale et des coupons paves
(10) B (r, i,
Lt]
t) = (1+ i)"- ['-- r( _1_\U
..... \1+1/«; 1
1 \ Itli+ 1 .-... 11001,,/ J
= (1 ')"-[~ i- , (_1 \llll100+ £ . + . \ 1 . I
L I \ + L/ ,
100 = valeur nominale de bon;
= duree de vie du bon mesuree en unites de periodes de mise
en payement du coupon (nombre reel);
IX = [t] - t, de sorte que 1- IX = fraction de la periode de mise
en paiement du coupon qui reste cl courir jusqu'au paiement
suivant (voir note 1);
= rendement par periode du ban qui vient a echeance fixe a
la date t;
B(r, i, t) = valeur actualisee du bono
1. Le prix de transaction est egal au prix de marche affiche augmente de l'interet simple
au taux de l'obligation consideree, Si I'on appelle IX la fraction de periode ecoulee depuis
le paiement du dossier coupon, I'interet simple est 1Xr. En ajoutant I'interet simple au prix
du marche, les courtiers en valeurs ne font que corriger I'erreur mathernatique que l'on
commettrait en utillsant les tables donnant la valeur des obligations. ~ prix de transaction
entre l'acheteue et le vendeur qui resulte de cette correction est une bonne approximation
de la valeur de I'obligation actualisee au taux d'interet constant i.
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Un algorithme a ete utilise pour calculer le rendement d'un bon B.T.P.
a une date donnee d'observation. On obtient ainsi une valeur de i qui donne
une valeur actualisee du bon (10) assez precise pour se situer a I'interieur
de la fourchette des prix observes pour ce bon 2. Le nombre des bons B.T.P.
sur le marche a une date quelconque etait de 8 ou 9, et la duree restant a
courir avant echeance allait de 0 a 9 ans. Une courbe de rendement en forme
d'hyperbole equilatere a ete ajustee a eet ensemble de rendements calcules
(11) . b ~~= 1+-+S:t
ou s: est un terme residuel distribue normalement avec une esperance nulle
et une variance constante. Cette courbe de rendement pour les bons du Tresor
represente le taux de rendement du marche a une date donnee sur des paye·
ments futurs qu'on peut considerer comme certains. A partir de cette courbe
du rendement estime, on peut alors determiner d'apres (10) ce qu'aurait ete
le prix du marche pour une obligation a eeheance aleatoire si l'on avait connu
avec certitude sa future date d'echeance. Compte tenu des probabilites d'e-
cheance et de cet ensemble de valeurs actualisees possibles a une date donnee,
I'esperance de la valeur actualisee d'un bon a echeance aleatoire est
(12)
q
!l-u= ~B(r, i, t).gs(r,q)
.'~1
ou s est la loterie qui prend place avant la date de remboursement t. La variance
due aces loteries est alors
(13)
q
()~= ~ [B (r, i, t) - !l-u12 gs (r, q)
s=1
Les obligations de l'I.M.1. viennent a echeance entre 0 et 19 ans, I'esperance
mathematique de I'echeance etant de 12 ans pour l'obligation ayant I'echeance
observee la plus lointaine. Cela implique que les courbes de rendement des
bons B.T.P. ont ete utilisees bien au-dela des valeurs observees en ce qui
coneerne le temps qui reste a courir jusqu'a I'echeance de ces bons B.T.P .
."'-
L'estimation b: dans (11) peut etre c..onsideree comme le rendement a long
terme des bons du Tresor ; les ecarts-types estimes des bOI sont faibles, la sta-
tistique t de Student la plus faible etant t = 49,63, alors que le seuil theo-
rique correspondant t6(O,05) = 2,45. Les bv doivent done dormer une indi-
cation assez sure de ce que seraient les rendernents de marche a long terme
pour des payements futurs que I'on peut raisonnablement tenir pour certains.
Il faut d'autre part tenir compte des covariances entre les resultats des
loteries relatives a differentes emissions. Comme il n'y a aucun lien entre les
loteries successives, toutes les covariances dues aux seules loteries sont nulles.
n existe cependant une source de covariation entre les payements des diffe-
rents emprunts, c'est ceile qui provient de la possibilite que l'I.M.1. soit
incapable de faire place aces remboursements futurs. On doit tenir compte
de cette source d'incertitude parce que les prix de marche observes pour des
titres alternatifs qu'on peut raisonnablement tenir pour certains sont ceux
des bons B.T.P. du Gouvernement a echeance fixe, et non des bons de l'I.M.1.
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Le risque tenant a la seule loterie peut done ne pas etre la seule source d'incer-
titude : il peut egalement y avoir une difference dans les risques de cessation
de payement des bons par l'I.M.1. et par le Tresor. En emettant et en vendant
des bons, l'I.M.1. distribue des creances sur la distribution de probabilite
de son flux de recettes (cash flow). Si cette distribution de probabilite est
donnee, alors, quel que soit I'etat de la nature qui se realise, le montant total
paye aux detenteurs de titres emis par I'I.M.1. doit etre egal au montant que
I'I.M.1. est en mesure de payer :
(14) ajtw = ~ ajltw
I
Ott :
ajtw = montant que peut payer la firme j (en l'occurence, I'I.M.I.) a
I'epoque t lorsque I'etat de la nature w se realise;
ajltw = montant que doit payer la firme j au detenteur de titre 1a 'lepoque t
lorsque l'etat de la nature w se realise.
Lorsque le marche des creances dont le payement est certain est en equi-
libre, le prix de marche Vt d'une lire payable a la date t devient une donnee.
Un ensemble de payements a des lors une valeur de marche actualisee
si l'on omet l'indice temporel pour les valeurs actualisees, et de merne
on deduit alors de (14).
(15)
c'est-s-dire que la valeur actualisee de la firme j lorsque l'etat de la nature w
se realise (ici, il s'agit d'un flux de recettes) est egal a la somme des valeurs
actualisees, clans ce meme etat de la nature, des 1 titres emis par l'entreprise j.
L'esperance mathematique de la valeur actualisee au titre I est :
(.Ljl= ~ an« qw
w
Oli qw est la probabilite que la fume perceive un flux de recettes w. La somme
des esperances mathematiques des valeurs actualisees des titres 1 est :
w
2. Les procedures de calcul et l'estimation des courbes de rendement sont diecutees plus en
detail dans [24]. La construction des courbes de rendement pour lea bons B.T.P. est etudiee




(16) 1: fJ.JI = ~ aJwqw = fJ.j
1 w
OU fJ.J est I'esperance mathematique de la valeur actualisee de la firme j.
La variance de la distribution de probabilite des valeurs actualisees de la
firme jest:
'" (aJw - fJ.J)2qw-w (j= k)
Les variances-covariances entre les valeurs actualisees des titres I et 0
ernis par la firme j sont :
(17') Ij= k)
w
En sommant (17') par rapport a tous les titres emis par la firrne i. puis




cela signifie que la somme des variances et covariances entre les distributions
de probabilite des payements effectues aux detenteurs de titres emis par la
firme jest egale a la variance totale de la distribution des flux de recettes de
la firme j. Par consequent, en emettant des titres, la firme reporte sur ses
titres la variance de son flux de recettes. Si ce flux de recettes est incertain,
alors certaines variances et covariances entre ses titres seront non nulles.
Lorsque l'I.M.I. emet des bons, les variances et covariances entre tous
les bons seront egales s'il existe un danger immediat d'illiquidite pour l'I.M.l.
Une telle situation implique que le-meme pourcentage de la valeur nominale
des bons soit paye aux detenteurs de bons, etant donne que tous les bons ont
meme priorite vis-a-vis des actifs de 1'I.M.I. Une possibilite de cessation de
paiement a plus longue echeance implique, cependant, que la variance totale
de la distribution du flux de recettes de l'I.M.1. soit reportee de facon inegale
sur ses titres, les prets a long terme supportant alors une plus grande propor-
tion du risque de cessation de paiement. En ce cas, il est probable que tous les
flux de recettes possibles envisages par l'I.M.1. sont tels qu'ils permettent
a cette institution de faire face a ses paiements d'obligations a court terme,
et it n'y a pas alors de risque de cessation de paiement pour les prets venant a
maturite dans des delais assez courts.
Si les paiements futurs par l'I.M.!. sont incertains, et s'il y a aussi sur le
marche des titres emis par d'autres fumes dont les flux de recettes futurs sont
incertains, il se peut alors que les covariances entre les distributions de ces
flux de recettes ne soient pas toutes nulles. La covariance entre les valeurs
102.
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q'JJW' = probahilite que la firme j obtienne un flux de recettes
w et le firme k un flux de recettes w' :
~ ~ qww,=l..........
w w'
la covariance de titre l de l' entreprise j et de celui de la fume k est :
jGlt = ~ ~(alhl'- flll) (atw - flt) qlDw'..... .-
W w'
(j =F k)
En faisant la somme des -coearianoesdes titres de la firme j et en utiiisant
(15) et (16), il vient :
(18) (j =F k)
ce qui exprime que la somme des covariances des titres l de la firrne j avec la
fume k est egale a la covariance entre les firmes j et k.
En cas de risque de cessation de paiement par l'I.M.I., c'est la redistri-
bution du risque total (1j" (pour toutj et pour tout k) parmi ses titres jOlk qui
intervient dans la determination des prix relatifs des titres a I'equilibre. Ce
risque de cessation de paiement intervient concurremment avec le risque dil
aux loteries, de sorte que l'incertitude mesuree en termes de variance des
loteries peut ne pas constituer une mesure de l'incertitude totale tene que
l'exige l'hypothese d'un systeme de prix a I'equilibre (8).
On peut soutenir cependant qu'un risque de loterie eleve [reduit] est
associe a un risque de cessation du paiement reduit (eleve). Cela depend
de l'etendue des valeurs de marehe des bons equivalents en avenir certain,
de la duree qui reste a courir jusqli'a I'echeance du pret et du caractere plus
OlI moins immediat du risque de cessation de paiement. Faute de connaitre
la facon dont, a chaque date, les investisseurs percoivent l'avenir du Gouver-
nement italien et celui de l'I.M.I., il n 'est pas possible de dire a priori si le




On a choisi comme periode d'observation les annees 1958 a 1963 3, qui
devraient constituer une periode assez longue pour pouvoir effectuer un
test de la stabilite intertemporelle de I'hypothese d'existence d'un prix d'equi-
libre. Etant donne que les mois les plus actifs au point de vue financier sont
ceux de mai, juin et septembre c'est, pour chaque annee, parmi ces mois-la
qu'a ete tire un echantillon aleatoire de quarante jours ouvrables.
En ce qui conceme les titres de l'I.M.I. negociables ces jours-la, on a
utilise Ies brochures d'information publiees par l'I.M.1. [8) en meme temps
que les courbes de rendement estime pour les bons B.T.P. afin de calculer
l'esperance mathematique (.Lid et la variance (1,'d des valeurs actualisees de
bon j le jour d'observation d. L'interet simple au taux du coupon a ete ajoute
au prix de marche observe pour obtenir le prix de transaction Pid.
Le modele d'equilibre ayant ete specifie pour un montant donne de titre!',
une variable indicatrice a ete utilisee pour tenir compte de ['etIet possible
de la vente de titres nouveaux sur les prix de marche observes :
sd=
1 si de nouveaux bons sont emis par I'I.M.I.
o sinon
Pour tester I'hypothese qu'il existe un prix de marche <lu rIsque -;'r>.
il est commode d'introduire le concept de prime de risque
Djd = (.Lid - Pid
et de reecrire (8) sous la forme :
Comme les loteries peuvent ne pas etre la seule source d'incertitude, nou-
supposerons que la difference dans les risques de non-paiement entre les hons
B.T.P. et les bons de l'I.M.I. affecte tous ces deniers de facon identique, de
sorte qu'une tene difference dans le risque de non-paiement se traduit par
un terme constant 4 non nul dans la regression :
A partir de toutes les observations on a obtenu 5





Somme des carres des residus (S.C.R.) = 1 857,89.
Ce resuitat tend a confirmer le modele d'equilihre esperance-variance.
Le prix de marche du risque ainsi estime est significativement different de
zero. La significativite de la variable indicatrice sd suggere que dans I'en-
semble, l'I.M.I. a subi une baisse de 3 % sur les prix des bons dont I'emission
n'etait pas encore close par rapport aux bons appartenant a des emissions
deja closes. Le fait que le terme constant soit significativement different de
zero signifie que les bons de l'I.M.I. se negociaient a des prix qui etaient
inferieurs d'environ 2,5 % aux prix qui auraient ete payes pour des bons
similaires qu'aurait emis le Tresor italien.
La regression (19) explique environ la moitie de la variance totale, si bien
qu'il peut aussi exister d'autres facteurs affectant les primes de risque obser-
vees. La positivite du terme constant conduit a s'interroger sur la possibilite
qu'il ait existe un risque de non-paiement dont if n'a pas ete tenu compte en
calculant les esperances et variances des bans de I'I.M.I.
n se peut donc que l'estimation du prix de marche du risque soit affectee
par le fait que les courbes de rendement ont ete etablies pour des bons B.T.P.
et non pour des bons de l'I.M.1. a echeance fixe. La forme de la courbe de
rendement des bans B.T.P. est censee traduire les anticipations relatives aux
changements futurs de taux d'interet, aux prix des biens, aux risques de non
paiement par le Tresor, ainsi qu'aux autres facteurs economiques pertinents,
La raison qui aurait pu conduire l'I.M.I. a avoir une courbe de rende-
ment pour les bons It echeance fixe differente de celle pour les B.T.P. serait
la possibilite qu'il ait existe une difference dans les risques de non-paiements
entre l'I.M.1. et le Tresor italien.
Une telle difference affecterait le calcul des esperances des valeurs actuali-
sees et des variances dans (10). Cet effet dependrait du coupon et du temps
restant jusqu'a I'echeance du titre t. Etant donne que t et T ont deja ete utilises
tous les deux pour les calculs de [ljd et de (J2jd, iln'existe pas de may-endirect
d'etudier la difference possible dans les risques de non-paiement. L'intro-
duction de t et T comme variables explicatives it cote de r;2 id conduit a un pro-
bleme d'identification. Cette question de risque de non-paiement etant cepen-
dant importante, on a choisi de I'etudier en introduisant des variable- indi-
catrices pour les coupons des differents bons de l'I.M.1. Au cours de cette
periode, les bons de l'I.M.1. negociables sur le marche ont ett> des hons a 5 00,
5,5 % et 6 %. Les deux variables indicatrices sont :
1 si le coupon est de 6 %
Cl
10 -smon
1 si le coupon est de 500
C2 =
I 0 sinon
3. Les lois fiscales italiennes ayant ete modifiees en 1971, la periode d'observation a du etre
choisie hien avant cette date pour que les prix relatifs des bons ne scient pas affectes par
les effets attendus des changements futurs dans la legislation fiscale.
4. Les ltaliens ont eu depuis longtemps la possibilite d'utiliser des bons B.T.P. pour regler
a un taux reduit le montant des droits de succession. Toutefois, aucune modification
n'ayant ete apportee a cette reglementation au cours de la periode etudiee, cette possibi-
lite s' est tout au plus repercutee sur le terme constant.
5. On a choisi un niveau de signification de 5 0". Lf'~ ecarts-types estirnes sont donnes entre
parentheses au-dessous de chaque estimation.
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on obtient ainsi la regression :
(20) n= 2,06 + 0,48 a2 - 0,87 Cl + 2,38 C2 + 2,95 sd
(0,429) (0,023) (0,409) (0,447) (0,192)
R2 = 0,72;
361 observations;
S.C.R. = 1 048,51.
n est clair d'apres (20) que l'usage des courbes de rendement des B.T.P.
souleve un probleme, puisque les deux variables indicatrices de coupon sont
significativement differentes de zero et que le coefficient de determination
a considerablement augmente, L'introduction de ces variables indicatrices de
coupon augmente l'estimation du prix du risque. Si l'on etudie separement
ces trois sous-echantillons, on obtient :















Les estimations du prix du risque different fortement dun g:rol1pc il
I'autre, et pour les coupons it 5,5 % le coefficient y n'est plus significatif.
Ces bons a 5,5 % n'ont ete negociables sur le marche que pendant 19 des
40 jours observes. Parmi les deux emissions it 5,5 ~;.. l'une est venue a echeance
en 1961 et une autre a ete ouverte en 1963. Le placement de cette nouvelle
emission a affaibli considerablemeiit son prix, tandis que le risque de loterie
h'a joue, semble-toil, qu'un role negligeable dans la determination du prix.
En ce qui concerne les bons it 5 0;" le nombre de telles emissions sur le
marche a varie de 1 it 3 durant la periode d'observation, Trois nouveaux em-
prunts it 5 % ont ete ernis, et le placement de ceux-ci a affecte significative-
ment les prix du marehe : le "( 5 % est particulierement eleve, 11 fois plus
grand que le prix du risque estime it partir de I'ensemble de I'echantilion.
A partir de la colonne de droite du tableau 1, 011 voit que b, pour les courbes
de rendement estimees pour les bons B.T.P. est voisin 01"5 no (ou legerement
inferieur] pour la plupart des dates d'observarion. On peut considerer hI
comme le taux dinteret a long terme sur les bons d'Etat. et le fait qu 'il soit
proche du coupon des bons a 5 % indique une faible dispersion dans len-
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semble des valeurs actualisees possibles de ces bons et, partant, de
faibles valeurs pour les variances calculees, Les bons a 5 % sont donc peut-etre
ceux qui sont le plus affectes par l'utilisation des courbes de rendement des
B.T.P., et il convient de garder ce fait present a l'espri(!'pour interpreter la
valeur elevee de y 5 % •
Les coupons a 6 % dominent l'echantillon pour ce qui est du nombre
d'observations, et c'est pour ce groupe que I'on a probablement l'estimation
la plus digne de confiance du prix de marche du risque, '( 6 % = 0,5. C'est
une difference marquee entre les rendements du B.T.P. et le coupon a 6 %
qui cause la variation du (12 estime. Le nombre de differents bons a 6 % negocies
sur le marche au cours de la periode a varie entre 4 et 7.
Les resultats ci-dessus suggerent qu'il existe bien un prix de marche du
risque, et on va maintenant tester si ce prix de marche est reste stable au cours
du temps. Le test est limite au sous-echantillon des bons a 6 %. Pour chaque
annee, on a choisi une seule date d'observation, celle qui est la plus proche
du 15 mai, Cependant, en 1963, 1'I.M.L a emis un nouvel emprunt a 6 % le
3 avril, Cet emprunt n'a pas ete cote en Bourse avant le 3 juin, et it est probable
que le placement de ce nouvel emprunt a affecte les prix de marche des autre"
titres de 1'I.M.1. pendant les deux mois OU aucune cotation officieHe n'a (~tc
faite sur le nouvel emprunt. Aussi, bien que la date d'observation la plus
proche de la rni-mai 1963 ait ete le 7 mai, la date retenue pour le test de stabi-
lite a ete ceUe du 3 juin : tout en etant l'une des dates cl'observations, cette
date est aussi ceHe OU les bons du nouvel emprunt ont commence a etre cotes :
Date . 11-5-59 19-5-60 19-5-61 11-5-62
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(0,023) (0,045) 0,052) (0,063)
2,36"
ad - - I (0,446)
\ 0,78'









h.J. .•••.•••.•... - .. - - •......... I (0,480)
------- -- -- --------
R2 ......... _.................. 0,93 0,99 0,98 0,98 0,98
S.C.R ..... _................... 1,3270 0.1217 0,7592 0.8415 0.7418
Nombre d'observations a la date d. -; 7 7 ';' .5
Les ('(wifici ..n t s «s unu-s qui son t ~Ignicatifs soul m<1rqu/·....par line as tvri-srjm-.
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Pour tester la stahilite duopm de marche du risque sur des intervalles
annuels [e'est-a-dire en comparant Ies dates deux a deux, on a choisi pour
bypothese nulle
fIjd % = all+l'aJd + hllSdid
contre l'hypotheee alternative precedente. Si 1'0n introduit alors des variables
indicatrices :
tdi =
1 si I'observation a ete faite it la premiere date
o si I'observation a ete faite it la deuxierne date
1- t d:
on obtient les regressions
I
Numer08 des observations ....... ! 1 et 8 8 et 14 14 et 25 25 et 36
!
I
, \ 0,65 0,58 0,57 0,52
y ............................. / (0,053) (0,026) (0,032) (0,042)
\ 2,76 0,92 1,54 4,04al ............................ I
(0,291) (0,171) (0,226) (0,269)
----- ----
\ 0,65 1,52 3,84 1.39a2 ............................
I (0,297) (0.174) (0.207) (0,473)
aa ............................ \ 0,21 0,23 -0,09 0,61
I (0,381) (0,272) 0.485) (0,623)
---~----- .- --'--
( 0.04 -0.11 0.34 0.34a4 ............................
I (0,428) (0,365) (0,479) (0,554)
! ---
R2 ............................ ! 0,96 0,99 0,98 0,97
S.C.R ......................... 1 2,1070 0,8921 1.6030 2,1060
Nombre d'ohservations .......... 1 - 14 14 14 12
•Statistique F ................... F1,s= 3,64 Ft,s=0.10 Fl,S=0,01 F1,6= 1,98
I,
Etant donne que :
F1,s (0,05) = 5,32 F1,6 (0,05) = 5,99
on conclut que le prix de rnarche du risque est reste stable au cours de chaque
periode d'une annee,
Un test analogue de stabilite portant sur l'ensemble des cinq annees de
la periode etudiee a donne une somme de carres des residus valant 5,9982
dans l'hypothese nulle et 3,7912 alternative (pour 33 observations). La
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statistique F correspondante est done F4,18 = 2,62, qu'il faut comparer a la
valeur theorique F 4,18 (0,05) = 2,93. On en deduit que le prix de marche
du risque est reste stable sur cette periode de cinq ans.
L'ensemble des tests effectues sur cette periode 1958-1963 permet done
de conclure a la stabilite du prix du risque, aussi bien a court terme (un
an) qu'a moyen terme (cinq ans).
Il apparait d'apres (20), (20.1), (20.2) et (20.3) que les coefficients de
IT = a + y 112 + h sd ne sont pas homogenes pour les differents coupons,
toutes observations reunies, la statistique F correspondante etant alors :
F4•352 = 103,29
par consequent, lorsque I'on etudie I'ensemble des prix d'equiiibre pour tous
les bons de l'I.M.I. negocies sur le marche a chaque date d'observation, le
coupon devrait etre utilise pour distinguer les differents bons. Le nombre de
bons de l'I.M.I. sur le marche a une date quelconque variant de 8 a 10, il ne
resterait plus qu'un seul titre sur le marche lorsque des bons a 5,5 % sont
negocies. Cela interdit d'utiliser des variables indicatrices de coupon cornme
dans (20). Alternativement, on peut considerer le coupon a 6 % comme le
coupon normal pour les bons emis par I'I.M.I. (puisque les coupons a 6 %
ont toujours constitue la majorite des titres echanges sur le marche] et intro-
duire comme variable explicative la difference 6 - r entre le coupon normal
et le coupon r du bon considere,
Cette suggestion n'implique pas que le coupon ait un effet direct sur la
prime de risque. Mais il peut sembler raisonnable, etant donne le faible
nombre d'observations pour chaque date, de reperer les bons par leurs coupons
afin de tenir compte de l'utilisation des courbes de rendement B.T.P. La
variable indicatrice des ventes n'a pas ete utilisee dans les regressions journa-
lieres paree que cette variable n'est pas significative pour rune queleonque
des 5 dates selectionnees dans I'etude des bons a 6 %. Il serait sans doute trop
grossier de reperer les efforts journaliers de vente par l'I.M.1. pour les hons
des differents emprunts, et il ne semble pas qu'un gain possible en explication
compense la perte d'un degre de liberte,
Le tableau 1 donne les regressions journalieres pour les marches a I'equi-
libre. Les prix du risque estimes sont tous significativement differents de zero.
Les coefficients de determination sont eleves, ce qui fournit une indication
supplementaire de la signification ecohomique de modele d'equilibre esperance-
variance. Toutefois, comme la variable coupon a ete utilisee pour distinguer
entre les bons, ces regressions ne constituent pas a proprement parler un test
du modele esperance-variance,
Ces regressions du tableau 1 devraient etre de quelque interet pour
l'I.M.1. dans sa politique d' emission. Compte tenu des courhes de rendement
pour les bons B.T.P., l'I.M.I. peut ohtenir certaines indications concernant le
prix auquel il est possible de placer une nouvelle emission de bons annuels
compte tenu du coupon et de l'echeance de ces bons. l'I.M.1. pourrait avoir
interet a mettre au point une variable independante qui tienne compte de ses
efforts journaliers de vente, a l'aide de laqueUe il pourrait alors faire des
previsions tres precises,
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4 Criteres d'investissement
Les resultats empmques ci-dessus devraient etre utiles pour les entre-
prises en ce qui conceme leurs decisions d'investissement. Etant donne le
rendement des hons d'Etat et ce prix de marche du risque, une entreprise
peut se faire une idee approximative du pm auquel elle sera a meme de vendre
de nouveaux titres sur le marche. EUe peut aussi determiner les effets d'inves-
tissements nouveaux sur le pm de marche de ses titres emis anterieurement.
A titre d'exemple simple, on peut considerer une entreprise qui lance
un programme d'investissement etale sur deux ans, apres quoi l'entreprise
cesse toute activite. La distrihution de probabilite du flux de recettes resultant
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Le rendement des titres d'etat est suppose tel qu'un titre au nominal
d'1 L a echeanoe d'une annee se negocie a 0,9 L, tandis qu'un titre d '1 L a
ech6ance de deux ans se negocie a 0,8 L On en deduit que, pour l'investisse-
ment considere ei-dessus, l'esperance" de la valeur actualisee est !J. = 170
et la variance 0'2 = 1,62.
Si l'entreprise decide de financer ses operations en vendant des actions
sur le marehe, la valeur totale de ses titres sur le marche sera (en supposant
que les covariances avec les flux de recette des autres titres sur le marche
sont nuUes et que'( = 1/2) :
PE =!J.- '(0'2=169,19
Alternativement, l'entreprise peut envisager la possibilite de vendre un
hon et de financer le solde par la vente d'une action. Le hon consiste en une
promesse de payer 100 L au hout d'un an, avec des garanties suffisantes pour
que l'on puisse considerer qu'un tel paiement sera effectue avec certitude.
111.
Ce bODeonstitue done un investiseement SUr et l'entreprise pourra le vendre
pour 100 X 0,9 = 90 L. Quant aux actions, leur distribution de probabilite
est alors :
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L'esperance de la valeur actualisee de cette action est (.LE = 80 et sa va-
riance G~= 1,62, de sorte que le prix de marche de cette action sera de 79,19;
la valeur totale sur le marche des titres de cette entreprise sera
90 + 79,19 = 169,19.
On voit ainsi que la valeur totale sur le marche des titres de I'entre-
prise ne depend pas de la facon dont l'investissement est finance, ce qui
confirme le theoreme de MODIGLIANI-MILLER [14]. MOSSIN [17] a demontre
que cette proposition est valide pour les modeles d'equilibre esperance-
variance; il a egalement montre que le risque de non-paiement ne modifie
pas la valeur totale de l'entreprise sur le marche,
Dans le cas de risque de non-paiement (ce qui revient a dire qu'il n'existe















et la distribution de probabili~ pour l'action :
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!LE = 80,45;a: = 0,6075;
comme le bon ne peut plus maintenant etre eonsidere comme un investisse-
ment sur, il y a une covariance non nulle (jSE = 0,2025 entre les distributions
de probahilite des valeurs actualisees du bon et de l'action. La valeur de marche
du bon sera alors !LB - Y (a; + aBR) = 89,145 et celle de l'action sera
!LE - Y(a~+ aBK) = 80,045, de sorte que la valeur totale des titres de l'entreprise
sur le marche sera 169,19, ee qui est la meme valeur que pour les deux autres
modes de finaneement. Le fait que l'entreprise n'offre pas de garantie pour le
bon a abaisse de 90 L a 89,145 L le prix auquel le marche accepte ee bono
En ce qui concerne I'entreprise, eela peut s'interpreter de la faeon suivante :
lorsque ce paiement du bon est garanti, le taux d'interet sur ce bon est de1::_ 1 # 0,11, ou 11% par an; sinon, il est de 89~~~5- 1 # 0,12, ou 12 %
par an. Ainsi, l'existence d'une garantie de paiement sur ce bon implique
un abaissement de 1% sur le taux d'interet auquel l'entreprise peut em-
prunter.
Ces exemples montrent que c'est en general Ia distribution de probabilite
des flux futurs de reeettes que I'entreprise peut engendrer qui determine sa
valeur totale sur le marche, Les valeurs sur le marche des titres de l'entreprise
dependent a leur tour des regies de partage concernant les flux totaux de
recettes, Mais ces regles ne changent pas la valeur totale de ces titres sur le
marche. -
Pour voir qu'il s'agit la d'une propriete generale du modele d'equilibre
esperance-variance, on peut ecrire le prix de marche du titre 1 emis par I'en-
treprise j
(21) P/1 = !L11- Y (~jalk + ~ /'lo)
k 0
(k¥j)
ou ~jalk est la somme des covariances des titres de l'entreprise j avec les
k
autres entreprlses (k ¥ J) et ~l'lo est la somme des variance et covariances
o
du titre I avec les autres titres emis par I'entreprise j. En sommant (21)
pour tous les titres l, et en utilisant (16), (17), (18), il vient
~Pjl=Pj
Cela signifie que, pour une distribution donnee des flux de recettes d'une
entreprise, la valeur totale de cette entreprise sur le marche ne depend pas
de la structure de son capital. Il est alors interessant de se demander si diffe-
rentes structures de capital permettent a une entreprise de choisir entre diffe-
rents ensembles d'activites economiques ou entre differents investissements.
Lorsque c'est le cas, l'entreprise devrait choisir, parmi les possibilites qui lui
sont ouvertes, les investissements et la structure de capital qui lui permettent
de maximiser la valeur actualisee totale de ses titres sur le marche, C'est la un
objectif qui se rencontre communement et qui correspond a la maximisation
de la richesse actualisee dans le cas certain 6.
Conclusion
On a etudie dans cet article la formation des prix de marche pour des
contrats portant sur des paiements futurs aleatoires. Dans le cas certain, il est
bien connu que les investiesements doivent etre choisis de maniere a maxi-
miser la valeur actualisee de la richesse. En incertitude, le modele d'equilihre
esperance-variance fournit une hypothese testable sur les prix observes des
titres, pourvu qu'il existe un marche pour les droits certains.
on a teste ce modele esperance-variance en utilisant les donnees du marche
italien des obligations. Le modele s'en trouve confirme. L'estimation du prix
du risque est voisine de 0,5 L par unite de variance; eUe est stable sur un
intervaHe de cinq ans, et aussi sur des sous-intervalles d'une annee,
Pour une entreprise qui assure son financement en vendant des titres sur
le marche, on a montre a l'aide d'exemples comment elle peut evaluer Ies
prix de rnarche de ses titres lorsqu'eHe connait le rendement des bons d'Etat
et le prix de marche du risque.
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The market price of risk
by Cornelius Schilbred
This article reports an empirical study of the market
price of risk. The securities used are bonds issued by
Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (I.M.I.) in Italy and also
Italian Government bonds.
I.M.1. borrows money through the Italian securities
market by issuing bonds. The repayment of its loans
is then arranged by series of lotteries, in order to
determine which bonds are to be redeemed at each
particular installment date. As the amounts to be
paid in installments are fixed in advance in the loan
agreements, I.M.I.'s bonds may be considered to have
their probability distributions of future payments to
the bond holders given.
In order to test the hypothesis of a market price of
risk, the article sets out by specifying an atemporal
mean-variance equilibrium model. It is assumed that
the relevant certainty alternative to investment in
I.M.1. bonds,is investment in bonds issued by the
Italian Government, so that theiryield may be used to
take care of the fact that payments fall due at different
times in the various I.M.1. bond issues.
A random selection of 40 trading days during the
years 1958-1963 was then made. The yield curves
for Italian Government bonds on these dates were
estimated. Then the probabilities associated with the
outstanding I.M.1. bonds were used to compute their
means and variances of present values.
With the computed means and variances, various tests
of the equilibrium price hypothesis was carried out.
The tests tend to confirm that there exists a market
price of risk. The price of risk appears to be close
to £ 0.5 per unit of variance. This price was found to
be stable over the five year period, and also over sub-
intervals of one year.
At theend, the article shows through simple examples
how the mean-variance equilibrium model may be
applied in investment and financing decisions. It




El precio del riesgo
por Cornelius Schilbred
Este artkulo relata los resultados de un estudio aplicado
relativo al precio del mercado del riesgo. Se utlllzaron,
para dicho estudlo, las obligaciones emitidas en Italia
por el Istituto mobiliare italiano (I.M.I.) asi como las
obligaciones del propio Estado ltaliano.
El I.M.1. pide prestado dinero en el mercado financiero
italiano emitiendo obligaciones cuyo reembolso se
efectua mediante loterias que determinan cuales son
las obligaciones que van a ser reembolsadas a cada
vencimiento. Como los importes de estos reembolsos
se determinan por antelaci6n segun modalidades del
emprestlto, puede considerarse que los bonos del
I.M.1. tienen, por 10 que se refiere a futuros pagos, una
distribuci6n de probabilidad, la cual constituye una
informaci6n para los portadores de dichos bonos.
Con objeto de comprobar la hip6tesis segun
la cual existe un precio del mercado del riesgo, el
articulo comienza por la especificaci6n de un modelo
atemporal de equlllbrio esperanza-variaci6n. Se supone
que el equivalente cierto que conviene considerar
como una alternatlva de las obligaciones del I.M.1.
esta constituido por las obllgaciones emitidas por el
Estado Italiano, de manera que el tipo de estas ultimas
puede utillzarse para tener en cuenta el hecho de que
los pagos relatlv_Ds a diversos emprestltos del I.M.I. no
son slmutaneos.
Se ha elegido entonces, a ventura, cuarenta dlas habiles
para el periodo de 1958 a 1963 y se ha estimado la
curva de rendimiento para los bonos del Estado italiano
en cada una de estas fechas. Luego, se utilizaron las
probabilidades asociadas con las obligaclones del I.M.1.
en circulaci6n para calcular las esperanzas y las varian-
c1as de sus valores actualizados.
Con la ayuda de estas esperanzas y variancias calculadas
de este modo. pudieron lIevarse a cabo diferentes
pruebas de la hip6tesis segun la cual existe un precio
de equilibrlo del riesgo. Las pruebas tienden a confirmar
la existencia de semejante precio del rlesgo, el cual at
parecer es de 0,5 lira aproximadamente por unidad de
varlancla. Aparecl6 que este precio del riesgo era esta-
ble para el conjunto del periodo, 0 sea un quinquenio,
asr como para sub-Intervalos de un ano.
Por ultimo, se demostr6 mediante ejemplos slmples en
que forma puede utllizarse este modelo de equillbrio
esperanza-varlancla en las decisiones relatlvas alas
inverslones y a su financlamlento, a la par que se
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